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Abstract: Low- and moderate-income (LMI) households with children often face considerable 
difficulties in ensuring enough financial resources for an adequate diet. This project investigates 
the use of financial services and other financial decisions parents make that may affect the risk of 
very low food security and food insecurity of children. With households in both the December 
2008 Current Population Survey (CPS) Food Security Supplement and the January 2009 CPS 
Unbanked and Underbanked Supplement, the project studies the relationship between bank 
account ownership, use of alternative financial service (AFS) providers, the organization of 
household finances, and the food security of children.  Both children in unbanked households 
and those in households that use AFS products are more likely to experience very low food 
security and food insecurity than other households. Children in previously banked households 
face extremely high risk of food insecurity. Children in households that use AFS products that 
provide credit are more likely to experience very low food security than households using AFS 
product for basic financial transaction services. Large associations exist between the use of AFS 
products providing credit and child food insecurity but only pawn borrowing appears to have a 
causal effect. Couples that share at least some finances and jointly participate in financial 
decisions reduce the risk of child food insecurity. Evidence suggests that improved financial 
literacy and management skills could improve outcomes. Policies to eliminate childhood hunger 
should include a multifaceted approach that includes financial education, appropriate bank 
accounts, and access to low-cost credit. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Low- and moderate-income (LMI) households with children often face considerable difficulties 
in ensuring enough resources to meet their food needs. As such, the circumstances surrounding 
why some children in lower income households achieve food security while others become food 
insecure, or even worse, very low food secure is an important area for research. This project 
seeks to understand how the financial services utilized by households with children affect the 
food security status of these children. 
 
With a unique, nationally representative dataset of households in both the December 2008 
Current Population Survey (CPS) Food Security Supplement and the January 2009 CPS 
Unbanked and Underbanked Supplement, this project examines both the food security status of 
children in these households and the full array of financial arrangements utilized by these 
households. It captures households with children across the food security spectrum, the 
mainstream financial services (i.e. bank accounts) and the alternative financial services (such as 
check cashers, payday lenders, pawn shops, rent-to-own outlets, and tax refund anticipation 
loans) utilized.  It also explores the pooling of household’s financial resources between adults in 
the household to understand how financial organization of parents can affect the child’s food 
security outcomes. 
 
I identify factors associated with very low food security and food insecurity of children with 
cross-tabulations and regression-adjusted correlations between financial decisions made by 
parents and the food security status of their children. I find that children in unbanked households 
and those using AFS products are more likely to experience very low food security and food 
insecurity than other households. Unbanked households are 4.5 percentage points more likely to 
have child food insecurity that households that own a bank account. But, not all unbanked 
households face similar risks. Previously banked households face an extremely high risk of child 
insecurity, including a 2.6 percentage point increase in the risk of very low food security and an 
8.3 percentage point increase in the risk food insecurity, possibly due to an economic shock. 
Descriptive evidence suggests that improve financial education and management skills could 
improve outcomes, as could state laws that encourage the availability of appropriate bank 
accounts for LMI households.  
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When studying the use of AFS providers, AFS providing credit are associated with a greater risk 
of child food insecurity and very low food security than AFS products providing basic 
transactional services. But, use of AFS products providing financial transaction services by 
banked households appears to indicate a problem of liquidity constraints that increases the risk of 
child food insecurity. Use of AFS providers for credit is associated with large increases in child 
food insecurity and very low food security, especially for borrowing from a pawn shop or payday 
lender. While use of a payday loan is associated with an increase of 1.8 percentage points in the 
probability of very low food security among children, use of a pawn shop is associated with a 
12.0 percentage point increase in very low food security among children. For pawn borrowing, I 
estimate a causal effect on very low food security among children but do not find a causal effect 
from the use of payday loans. 
 
Finally, exploring the organization of finances for couples finds that when households share at 
least some resources, it lowers the risk of food insecurity among children. Additionally, joint 
participation in financial decisions appears to have a protective effect on food insecurity. 
However, I find only weak evidence that women with greater control over financial resources 
improve child food security outcomes.   
 
In total, the results of this project suggest that improved financial literacy and financial 
management skills would improve outcomes among those households with children at risk for 
food insecurity. Additionally, access to short-term credits that assist vulnerable households 
obtain adequate food during an economic shock would also reduce food insecurity. Finally, 
improved outreach that identifies both households that have a bank account closed by a bank and 
those living in communities with a large concentration of AFS providers may ensure that 
assistance is provided to households on the margin of child food insecurity.
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INTRODUCTION 
The ability to obtain adequate food indicates a household’s capacity to meet its basic 
consumption needs. In 2011, 8.6 million children in the U.S. (11.5 percent) lived in food 
insecure households and nearly one million of these children experience very low food security, 
the most severe level of food insecurity (Coleman-Jensen et al., 2012). Yet, the problem of child 
food insecurity and very low food security is not solely a problem of living with limited means. 
Many low- and moderate-income (LMI) households with children face challenges in obtaining 
enough financial resources to meet their consumption needs but some children experience hunger 
while others do not. Understanding this puzzle will improve policies to eliminate childhood 
hunger. 
 
A potentially important but relatively unexplored determinant of a child’s food security status is 
the financial decisions made by parents. All households face common financial decisions, from 
how to budget income to where to access credit. Divergent food security outcomes across 
otherwise similar households could possibly be explained by some parents making financial 
decisions that increase the child’s risk for very low food security and food insecurity. Parents 
that forgo a bank account could miss opportunities to save and access affordable credit, limiting 
opportunities for consumption smoothing during economic shocks. Parents that choose an 
alternative financial service (AFS) provider, a non-bank provider of financial services, could 
incur high costs for these services that crowd out food-related spending.  And, when parents 
choose to share finances or jointly make financial decisions with their partner, households may 
realize economies of scale and make better choices to meet the food needs of their children. 
 
This study examines the relationship between the use of financial services, the organization of 
household finances, and child food security outcomes with data from the December 2008 Current 
Population Survey (CPS) Food Security Supplement and the January 2009 CPS Unbanked and 
Underbanked Supplement. Using households interviewed in two consecutive months of the CPS, 
I create a nationally representative dataset containing food security outcomes, bank account 
history, use of AFS providers, and household financial organization. This unique data provides 
new evidence on a relatively unexplored aspect of food security among children.  
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I identify factors associated with very low food security and food insecurity of children with 
cross-tabulations and regression-adjusted correlations between financial decisions made by 
parents and the food security status of their children. I find that children in unbanked households 
and those using AFS products are more likely to experience very low food security and food 
insecurity than other households. However, when examining the data in greater detail, all 
unbanked households are not at equal risk. Instead, previously banked households face extremely 
high risk of child insecurity. Descriptive evidence suggests that these households may have 
experienced an economic shock that both transitioned them out of bank account ownership and 
led to child food insecurity.  
 
With use of AFS providers, I find that those providing credit increase the risk of child food 
insecurity and very low food security more than AFS products providing basic transactional 
services. Still, banked households that use AFS products for basic financial transactions, may 
increase the child’s risk of food insecurity that, perhaps, indicate the presence of liquidity 
constraints. Evidence that outcomes could be improved with better financial education and 
financial management skills of LMI households with children. 
 
In terms of AFS products providing credit for households, the use of pawn shops at any 
frequency is associated with substantial increases in the likelihood of child food insecurity. And, 
I find evidence that using pawn shops could increase very low food security.  Rent-to-own 
agreements are correlated with very low food security among children and food insecurity but 
state laws requiring the full disclosure of the purchase price may reduce the harmful effects of 
using these agreements. Payday loan use and frequent payday loan use is correlated with 
increases in very low food security and food insecurity but I find no conclusive evidence of a 
causal effect on measures of food insecurity of children. 
 
Finally, for households headed by couples, I find reductions in child food insecurity when adults 
share at least some resources and joint participation in financial decisions also reduces the risk of 
food insecurity among children. I find only weak evidence that women having greater control 
over financial resources improve child food security outcomes.   
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While many of the correlations I find do not imply that the financial services could cause child 
food insecurity, they are still useful for understanding childhood hunger and creating a 
multifaceted approach to reducing the problem of childhood hunger. They present new evidence 
about a previously unexplored aspect of the very low food security population of interest and, as 
such, could be used to improve targeting of existing resources, ranging from public service 
announcements that raise awareness about eligibility for food assistance programs to grants to 
local communities with a high concentration of alternative financial providers to partnering with 
other state and federal efforts to expand appropriate banking opportunities and regulate 
alternative financial providers. They also suggest that policies to combat childhood hunger 
should go beyond the food safety net but also explore options to connect households with 
financial services, including appropriate bank accounts for their needs and short-term credit that 
allows households to smooth an economic shock. 
 
BACKGROUND 
All households face common financial decisions, such as how to pool their income, budget their 
spending, and organize their finances. And, because households require financial services to 
convert income into payments, store funds for later use, make payments, and access credit when 
consumption needs exceed income, they must choose where to get services. Specifically, they 
much choose between many competing financial services offered by banks and non-banks. These 
decisions, in turn, could affect a household’s level of consumption and, therefore, child food 
security. This section discusses some common financial decisions faced by households. 
 
Bank Account Ownership 
The most basic of financial tools is a bank account. Bank accounts provide both basic 
transactional services, a secure location to store financial assets, and assistance in accessing 
credit markets. Yet, according to the Federal Depository Insurance Company (FDIC), 9 million 
children in the U.S. (13.6 percent) live in unbanked households, that is, households where no 
adult in the household owns a bank account (FDIC, 2012). Over the past two decades, the 
portion of unbanked households has remained fairly stable despite a large growth in the 
mainstream and alternative financial services industry (Barr 2004; Washington 2006).  
 
The cost associated with owning a bank account depends on features of the specific product 
offered by the bank, as well as how the household uses the account. Banks may charge fees to 
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maintain a checking account or use an ATM; households may pay additional fees if their balance 
falls below a minimum level or if they overdraw their account. However, the cost of not owning 
a bank account can also be high, resulting in paying fees for financial transaction services, 
including cashing checks and paying bills, and preventing the household from accessing the 
lower cost credit provided by banks (Barr, 2004; Rhine et al, 2006).  
 
A variety of policies to “bank the unbanked” exist due to the idea that bank accounts allow 
households to avoid high fees for financial transactions, save, and access credit (Barr 2004).  
Some criticize banks for offering products inappropriate for LMI households, charging excessive 
and/or hidden fees, imposing unreasonable delays in clearing some checks, and other practices 
(Barr, 2004; McGrary 2008; Mullainathan and Shafir, 2009). Others note that the cost of 
remaining outside the banking system may be less than generally assumed (Prescott and Tatar, 
1999). As a result, evidence suggests that for some households, not owning a bank account may 
be the least costly choice (Lyons and Scherpf, 2004; Mullainathan and Shafir, 2008). 
 
Higher income households are significantly more likely to own a bank account than households 
with low or moderate income (Hogarth et al. 2005). Other characteristics associated with owning 
a bank account include employment; greater educational attainment; households headed by older 
adults, whites, non-Hispanics and married couples (Hogarth et al. 2005; Hogarth and O’Donnell 
2000l Rhine et al., 2006). Immigrants, especially those living in ethnic enclaves are less likely to 
be banked (Bohn and Pearlman 2013). 
 
In the U.S., the regulation of banks is highly fragmented. Banks offering checking and savings 
accounts are regulated by state and federal governments. At the federal level, there are three 
different regulators: the Federal Reserve for state-chartered banks that belong to the Federal 
Reserve System, the FDIC for state-chartered banks that do not belong to the Federal Reserve 
System, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) for nationally chartered banks.  
 
A number of public policies exist to encourage bank account ownership, ranging from federal 
efforts to expand the supply of low cost accounts with the U.S. Treasury’s First Accounts 
program to financial education programs like the MoneySmart program. Seven states have so-
called lifeline legislation that requires banks to offer low-cost accounts to low-income adults. 
7 
 
Additionally, a number of state and local governments joined the BankOn Campaign, an 
initiative that partners with banks and non-profits to expand financial access with outreach, 
financial education, and low-cost bank accounts. 
 
Alternative Financial Services (AFS) 
According to the FDIC, between 16.6 million and 25.6 million children in the U.S. (25.1 to 38.7 
percent) live in households that used an AFS product in the last year (FDIC 2012). Although 
there are a growing number of AFS products, for the purposes of this project, AFS products 
include: non-bank money orders, non-bank check cashing services, payday loans, pawn loans, 
rent-to-own agreements, and tax refund anticipation loans (RALs).  
 
Many AFS products are similar to services offered by a bank but come at a higher price (Barr, 
2004; Rhine et al, 2006). The fees, interest rates, and, in some cases, potential for debt associated 
with these products generate considerable controversy. Critics believe these services impose 
excessive costs and generate burdensome debt on vulnerable households; others argue that these 
providers fill an unmet need for financial products and extend short-term credit to those with few 
options when facing a cash shortage at a critical time (Mullainathan and Shafir, 2009).  
 
AFS products come in two types: financial transaction services and credit. Non-bank check 
cashers and non-bank money orders provide basic financial transaction services also provided by 
banks. Payday loans, pawn loans, rent-to-own agreements, and RALs, provide short-term credit. 
AFS products are used by both banked and unbanked households, although the unbanked are 
more likely to use these products. Underbanked households -- households that utilize AFS 
products despite owning a bank account – may do so because banks do not provide products that 
fully meet their needs, such as immediate clearing of checks or small loans. Unbanked 
households often must use AFS products to perform basic financial transactions, like cashing a 
check, and accessing credit. Use of AFS products is related low or moderate income, unbanked 
status, education, and age; non-whites, single adults, households with children, and Hispanics are 
more likely to use these products (Barr 2004; Caskey 1997; Caskey 2002; McKernan et al. 2003; 
Zinman 2010). 
 
A brief description of these products and their regulations is as follows: 
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• Non-bank Check Cashers. Non-bank check cashers convert a check into cash for a fee. 
In the U.S., there are approximately 10,000 non-bank business establishments whose 
primary business is check cashing and many other non-bank businesses that offer check 
cashing in addition to other services (Barr, 2004). Non-bank check cashers, generally, 
charge a flat fee plus a fee of 1.5 to 3.5 percent of the face value of the check (Barr 
2004). Considerable regional price variation exists and prices tend to be lower for 
government issued and payroll checks than personal checks due to the low default risk 
(Barr 2004).  One estimate suggests that a worker earning $12,000 would pay $250 
annually to cash payroll checks (Barr, 2004).  
 
There are ways to avoid these fees. Banks offer free check cashing to their customers 
and, at times, for checks drawn from a customer at their bank. Other establishments, such 
as convenience stores, liquor stores, and grocery stores, may also cash checks for 
purchasing customers without a charge. Banked households may use a non-bank check 
casher due to convenient locations. Or, because banks may require a customer to wait at 
least several days to clear a check, banked households may use a non-bank check casher 
to gain immediate access to funds from the check.  
 
Non-bank check cashers are lightly regulated at both the state and federal level. The 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) requires that check cashing services 
that partner with national banks set non-interest charges according to ‘sound banking 
judgment’ (Barr 2004). Currently, seventeen states limit the fees a non-bank check 
cashing outlets can charge or limit the number of check cashing outlets in a given area 
(Barr 2004; Caskey 1991).  
 
• Non-bank Money Orders. Money orders provide a means for bill payment. Many types 
of providers provide non-bank money orders, ranging from non-bank check cashing 
outlets to convenience stores to the U.S. Postal Service. Non-bank money orders typically 
cost $0.50 to $0.60 per money order while money orders purchased at banks cost $1 to $3 
(Barr 2004; Caskey 2002). Similar to checks, banked households may substitute a check 
for a non-bank money order. Because the amount is pre-paid and, therefore, payment is 
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guaranteed, some payees may require money orders rather than personal checks when 
paying some expenses, such a rent.  
  
• Payday Lenders. There are more than 20,000 payday loan locations in the U.S, issuing 
an estimated $38.5 billion in credit to 19 million households (Community Financial 
Services of America 2013). A payday loan allows a borrower to postdate a check or 
authorize an electronic funds transfer for the loan amount plus associated fees. The 
payday lender, in turn, agrees not to cash the check until a later date, often the borrower’s 
next paycheck. On the due date, the borrower either pays cash to redeem the check, 
allows the check to be cashed, or, in some states, pays a fee to extend the loan.  
 
The typical payday loan is a two week loan for $300 that incurs fees ranging from $45 to 
$90, resulting in an annualized percentage rate (APR) of 400 to 1,000 percent (Bair, 
2005; Elliehausen & Lawrence, 2001; Stegman & Faris, 2003). These high interest rates 
generate controversy and are one reason why the payday lending industry has received 
greater scrutiny from regulators, including from the newly formed Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB). 
 
Regulation of payday loans occurs at the state level. In general, state usury limits prohibit 
payday lending (Barr 2004; Flannery and Samolyk 2005). In 2008, 34 states had enacted 
specific legislation allowing payday lenders to either operate or charge interest rates 
above the usury limit (Flannery and Samolyk 2005). Fifteen states and the District of 
Columbia completely banned payday lending either through an explicit ban or an interest 
rate cap of 36% APR, a level which is generally considered too low to be profitable.  
 
Federal law does not limit payday lenders, except for members of the military who 
cannot be charged an APR of more than 36 percent.1
 
  Over the last decade federal 
banking regulators ended the so-called “rent-a-charter” agreements, where national banks 
paired with payday lenders to evade state usury limits and consumer protection laws 
(Barr 2004).  
                                                          
1 This occurred in October 2006 with the Talent-Nelson Amendment to the Defense Authorization Act. 
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• Pawn Shops. An estimated 10,000 pawn shops operate (National Pawnbrokers 
Association, 2013). Pawn shops provide short-term loans using a durable good as 
collateral. Durable goods that are typically pawned include jewelry, electronic 
equipment, musical instruments, and firearms.  The loan amount tends to be roughly fifty 
percent of the good’s value for a period of one to two months (Caskey, 1991). Upon 
maturity, if a customer does not repay the loan, ownership of the item is lost but the 
customer does not incur additional debt. 
 
The federal government does not regulate pawnbroking. Pawn shops are regulated by 
state and, at times, local government (Avery and Samolyck, 2011). Typically, states 
regulate the monthly fees charged by pawn shops and/or whether the borrower can 
recover any proceeds from the sale of item greater than the cost of the loan and fees 
(Avery and Samolyck, 2011). Some states also regulate the types of items that can be 
pawned. Oftentimes, pawn shops are required to report goods used as collateral to law 
enforcement agencies to ensure they are not receiving stolen property. 
 
• Rent-to-Own Contracts. The rent-to-own (RTO) is an $8.5 billion industry with 
approximately 9,800 rent-to-own stores serving 4.8 million customers in 2012 
(Association of Progressive Rental Organizations, 2013). Rent-to-own contracts allow the 
purchase of new and previously used household goods through a self-renewing weekly or 
monthly lease. The usual items purchased at an RTO include electronics, furniture, and 
home appliances (Association of Progressive Rental Organizations, 2013; Zikmund-
Fisher and Parker, 1999). If a customer is delinquent, the item is repossessed and the 
customer loses all accumulated equity. At the end of the rental term, the customer owns 
the item, but often ends up paying in total two to three times the retail price (McKernan et 
al. 2003).  
 
Rent-to-own contracts may be attractive to customers that do not wish to have a formal 
credit check and/or make a down payment. The size of the customer pool that rents an 
item until purchase is in dispute with a study by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
estimating that 67 percent of customers ultimately purchase the RTO item, while the 
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industry maintains only 25 percent of customers do so (Association of Progressive Rental 
Organizations, 2013; FTC, 2000).  
 
Rent-to-own contracts are not subject to federal regulation through the Consumer Leasing 
Act or the Truth-in-Lending Act. Nearly every state regulates these contracts in a manner 
similar to leases, although the particulars of these laws vary from state to state: 3 states 
require RTOs to disclose the APR they are charging, 18 require disclosures on product 
labels, and 15 require RTO stores to display the total cost of the item (McKernan et al. 
2003). 
 
• Tax Refund Anticipation Loans (RALs). In 2008, 8.4 million RALs were made, 
earning tax preparers $738 million in fees (Wu and Fox 2012). RALs provide a short-
term loan of the taxpayer’s expected income tax refund, less any associated fees when the 
tax preparer files a taxpayer’s federal and state income return. The tax preparation firm 
typically partners with a bank to issue the loan and the loan is repaid when the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) issues the borrower’s return. The most likely users of RALs are 
LMI households receiving the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and other refundable 
tax credits.  
 
For some households, RALs are attractive because the taxpayer receives the loan 
proceeds within a few days of filing the return. In contrast, banked taxpayer receive a 
direct deposit of their tax refund eight to ten days later and unbanked taxpayers receive 
refund checks four to six weeks later (Barr 2004; Berube et al. 2002). But, RALs are 
expensive and often compared unfavorably to the terms of a payday loans. In addition to 
at least $100 in tax preparation fees, RALs cost at least an additional $100 (Barr 2004; 
Berube et al. 2002). As a result, the total cost tends to be eight to fifteen percent of the 
taxpayer’s refund and the annualized interest rate on a RAL ranges from 150 percent to 
300 percent, depending on how long the IRS takes to process the refund (Barr 2004; 
Berube et al. 2002). 
 
The IRS regulates tax preparation services with fee limits and limits on advertising while 
banking regulators regulate the banks that partner with tax preparation firms. In recent 
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years, increased scrutiny of RALs by the federal government led to reductions in the 
number of RALs issued. The two largest tax preparation firms, Jackson Hewitt and H&R 
Block, stopped offering RALs in the 2010 and 2012 tax seasons, respectively. After April 
2012, access to this product effectively ended with the FDIC’s settlement with the last of 
the remaining banks still offering RALs (Wu and Fox 2012). 
 
Financial Decisions Faced by Households with More Than One Adult 
For households with more than one adult, they must decide how to organize their finances. 
Adults can choose either to make decisions about their finances independently or as one unit. 
When households share their finances, they can realize economies of scale in household 
production: the greater the extent of sharing, the greater the economies of scale. However, if 
adults have different preferences about how income should be spent, they may be better off with 
separate finances. This is particularly true if there is little slack in the budget and one adult 
spends the household income on a good for their own private consumption. Literature generally 
finds that the greater participation of both adults, particularly the women in the households, 
improves outcomes for children, a result attributed to female preferences for greater spending on 
children (Duflo 2012; Lundberg and Pollak 1996; Lundberg et al. 1997; Phipps and Burton 
1998). 
RESEARCH METHODS 
In this section, I present the model for how the use of different financial services may affect the 
food security outcomes of children, as well as how the organization of household finances affects 
child food security. I then discuss the empirical models used to identify these effects.  
 
Theoretical Model 
In order to motivate the empirical section, I adopt a simple multi-period model of a 
representative utility-maximizing household. Households consume only one good, food, denoted 
as c . In each period, the household receives income,ω , with which to purchase food. For 
simplicity, we assume that households know their income each period. Households solve the 
following problem:  
1) )(max
0
t
T
t
t cu∑
=
β  
subject to 
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2) ( )11 1 −− ++=+ ttttt rbbc ω  
 
where tb  is current savings, 1−tb is savings from the previous period, and 1−tr is the real interest 
rate earned on savings in the previous period. Assume that households are endowed with no 
assets so savings in period 1 is equal to 0 (i.e. 01 =−b ). 
 
I first consider the scenario where households cannot borrow or save so 0=tb in all periods. In 
this scenario, it is optimal for households to consume all income in each period. In other words, 
ttc ω= for all t . If we define food insecurity as the state where consumption is at or below a 
minimum level, mincct ≤ , then households will be food insecure in all periods in which 
.minct ≤ω   
 
Then, I allow households to use bank accounts and AFS providers. These financial services may 
alter this equilibrium because households can now smooth consumption across time. Formally, 
the ability of households to save or borrow (i.e. negative savings) leads to the following 
conditions, solved through a Lagrangian:  
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In order to easily compare equilibrium consumption with and without savings, we can assume 
that utility at period t is )ln( tc . Thus,  
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Food consumption in any given period is a function of the current interest rate and the marginal 
benefit of food consumption in the next period. Households find it optimal to equate marginal 
benefits across time periods. Because in each period the budget constraint must hold, we can use 
the inter-temporal budget constraint in order to compare the two equilibriums, with and without 
access to saving. Using the intertemporal budget constraint in period T, I can show:  
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The intuition for the above equation is that, starting in the first period, households can now 
optimally choose their food consumption, which may either be above or below their income level 
in the first period. For households with income above the minimum level to achieve food 
security in some periods and below it in others, the ability to smooth income across periods 
increases total lifetime utility, and increases food security. However, for sufficiently low levels 
of income, a household can still be food insecure, even with the ability to save.  
 
This simple and intuitive setup lends itself to predict how households would respond to other 
real-world extensions to the model, such as costs associated with borrowing or savings. 
Intuitively, increases in these costs lead the household to optimally borrow less money in each 
period and inhibits the ability to smooth income across periods. Therefore, the household optimal 
path will be closer to the equilibrium without borrowing (or saving) and, leads to more instances 
of periods of food insecurity within a certain range of income. Overall, lifetime utility will be 
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lower compared to the equilibrium without saving and borrowing. Similarly, the ability to 
borrow or save can be shown to improve household welfare as the household’s income stream 
becomes more volatile, or as future income becomes more uncertain.  
 
Additionally, once households face fixed costs with converting cash into check and income into 
payments, these financial transaction costs will crowd out food spending and also lead to more 
periods of food insecurity. These costs will lower lifetime utility and households will optimally 
choose the financial providers that offer the lowest financial transaction costs. As referenced in 
the previous section, it is uncertain as to whether bank accounts or AFS providers will be optimal 
because of uncertainty as to which provider will cost the least for any particular household 
(Lyons and Scherpf, 2004; Prescott and Tatar, 1999). 
 
Finally, this model implies a unitary households that shares all finances and jointly makes 
financial decisions, weighing each member’s utility equally. When households do not act as one 
unit due to differences in preferences, the outcome will depend on the relevant bargaining power 
of household members.  
 
Empirical Model 
To estimate these relationships, I estimate linear regressions of the form: 
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where the outcome variable, FoodInsecurity, represents a dichotomous measure of food 
insecurity of children, FinancialDecision represents any of the financial decisions of interest, 
DemoChar represents demographic characteristics of the household, EconChar represents 
economic characteristics of the household, and sλ represents state fixed effects to control for 
state characteristics and policies associated with food insecurity and/or financial services. All 
estimates are weighted by the Food Security Supplement (FSS) weight. 
 
The coefficient of interest, β2, reflects the correlation between the financial decision of interest 
and food insecurity of children. Interpreting β2should be done carefully because there are likely 
unobservable characteristics of households that relate to both their financial decision and their 
food security outcomes.  
16 
 
 
Using ordinary least squares (OLS), I control for demographic and economic characteristics of 
the household that have been found to be important in explaining food security and/or financial 
decisions (for examples, see Barr 2004; Gundersen et al. 2011; Hogarth and O’Donnell 2000). 
Demographic characteristics include indicators reflecting the household composition (single 
mother, married couple) with other parents serving as the omitted group.  I also control for age, 
nativity, and racial/ethnic characteristics with indicators reflecting the age range of the primary 
earner in the household (age age 30 – 39, age 40 – 49, age 50 – 59, age 60 and over) with ages 
less than 30 serving as the omitted group, controls for the age of the oldest child in the 
household, and dummies for racial/ethnic and nativity characteristics (non-Hispanic African 
American, Hispanic, and native born U.S. citizen).   
 
In the matrix of economic characteristics, I include controls for education, income, and 
employment. These include indicators for educational attainment of the most educated adult in 
the household (high school graduate, some college, four year college degree, more than a college 
degree) with less than high school serving as the omitted group, as well as a series of 
dichotomous variables for the household’s income to poverty ratio (100 percent – 130 percent, 
130 percent – 185 percent, 185 percent – 300 percent, above 300 percent, and, a dummy for 
missing income) with less than 100 percent serving as the omitted group. A household 
employment dummy variable captures the employment status of the most employed adult in the 
household: full-time workers; part-time worker; unemployed but looking for work; retired or out 
of the labor force for reasons other than disability; and, not in the labor force due to disability. 
Full-time employment serves as the omitted group. Because it is illegal to charge a member of 
the armed forces more than 36% APR, I also include an indicator if an adult is a member of the 
armed forces. Finally, I include the state-level unemployment rate in 2008 to capture economic 
conditions facing the household and the availability of mainstream financial institutions with a 
measure of bank density per 1,000 persons over age 16 in the CBSA.2
 
 
                                                          
2 This measure is constructed from the FDIC Summary of Deposit data for June 30, 2008 and population estimates 
from the American Community Survey. For households in a CBSA, I measure this at the CBSA level. For 
households not in a CBSA, I measure this at the state level. 
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Where possible, I try to present causal effects for the causal effects of financial products on food 
security of children using two-stage least squares (2SLS) techniques. The instruments for these 
analyses will come from state-level laws and regulations that may affect a household’s access to 
financial services.  Because the data is cross-sectional and the instruments are state laws in place 
in 2008, I replace state fixed effects with controls for state-level characteristics related to the 
generosity of the social safety net. The 2SLS models are of the form: 
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The matrices of demographic and economic characteristics remain the same as the earlier 
empirical model. State-level characteristics capture economic and policy characteristics of the 
state, including, the maximum state EITC for a household with two children, the state minimum 
wage in 2008, and an indicator that the governor is a Democrat. When these state laws and 
regulations isolate exogenous variation in the financial services used by households, 2φ provides 
the causal effect of financial services on food security. Robust standard errors, clustered at the 
state-level, are used. 
 
DATA 
Data for the analysis comes from the December 2008 and the January 2009 Current Population 
Survey (CPS). The December CPS is the Food Security Supplement (CPS FSS), the official 
source of food security statistics in the U.S. The CPS FSS asks respondents about household 
food spending, use of food assistance programs, and whether they were able to afford enough 
food. The January 2009 CPS contained a special FDIC-sponsored supplement, collecting 
information on the household’s experience with bank accounts, use of AFS providers, and 
financial arrangements of the household.  
 
To create a dataset containing information on both the food security status of children and the 
financial decisions of the adults in the household, households in both the December 2008 CPS 
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and the January 2009 CPS are linked following the recommendations of Madrian and Lefgren 
(1999).3
 
 The sample is then limited to households with children to focus on child outcomes. 
Food Security Measures 
I capture the food security status of children in the household over the past 12 months, based on 
the USDA’s classification of child food security status: high food security, marginal food 
security, low food security, and very low food security. These classifications are determined 
from the number of affirmative responses to 8 questions about conditions or behaviors that 
indicate difficulty in meeting the food needs of children in the household. Respondents affirming 
two or more items about their children correspond to food insecurity and five or more items 
correspond to very low food security. In the regressions, I examine very low food security 
among children and the less extreme food insecurity among children. Food insecurity, as defined 
by the USDA, includes children classified as either low food security or very low food security.  
 
Measures of Financial Services and Other Financial Decisions 
The primary variables of interest are the set of financial decisions made by adults in the 
household available in the CPS, particularly financial services. I measure unbanked households 
as those household where the respondent indicates that no one in the household currently owns a 
checking or a savings account. I also create a variable for previously banked households. The 
previously banked are those households that are currently unbanked but someone in the 
household owned an account at one time. 
 
I measure use of AFS products based on the questions in the January 2009 CPS, which asked 
respondents if they or anyone in the household ever did any of the following: cashed a check at a 
place other than a bank, purchased a money order at a place other than a bank, utilized a payday 
loan, sold items at a pawn shop, or leased from a rent-to-own store. For each of these AFS 
products, I create dichotomous variables indicating the household ever used these products. The 
CPS question related to the use of an RAL differs slightly, by asking if anyone in the household 
                                                          
3 I thank Alisha Coleman-Jensen for generously providing the matched sample of households. Coleman-Jensen first 
merged the FSS and FDIC supplement at the person level by state, household identification numbers, and person’s 
line number. Then, characteristics of persons across the two files were compared to ensure that the persons matched 
were indeed the same in both supplements. The December 2008 CPS Food Security Supplement sample included 
44,019 households and the January 2009 CPS supplement sample included 46,547 households.  The matched sample 
includes 29,466 households interviewed in both supplements. After limiting the sample to households with children, 
9,381 households with children completed interviews in both months. 
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used a RAL in the last five years. I treat use of an RAL analogously to the other products and 
create a dichotomous variable based on the household’s response. 
 
Because nearly all questions refer to ever using these AFS products, I use questions related to the 
frequency of use of AFS products to better link the timing of use of these products to the child’s 
food security status over the past 12 months. For use of a non-bank check cashing service, non-
bank money order, pawn shop, or rent-to-own agreement, the respondent indicates the frequency 
of use: a few times a year, once or twice a year, or almost never. For payday lending, the CPS 
specifically asks the number of times in the past 12 months anyone in the household used a 
payday lender. I use these frequency measures to look at intensity of use and likelihood the 
household used these services over the same period as the measure of food security. 
 
Finally, I look at the decision to organize household finances, for households with more than one 
adult. I examine the extent of financial resource sharing: shared finances, some shared and some 
separate finances, or separate finances despite sharing a living space. Respondents could also 
volunteer that they were the only adult in the household. From these responses, I create two 
outcome variables to examine different intensities of shared finances: complete sharing and at 
least some sharing. Households are classified as at least some resource sharing if they either 
completely share finances or share some finances. 
 
The extent of participation both adults have in financial decisions is also recorded in households 
with more than one adult. Respondents report the amount of participation they have in the 
financial decisions of the household: a lot, some, or not at all. From these responses, I create a 
variable indicating the respondent reports a lot of participation in financial decisions for the 
household. I create a second variable indicating the respondents report participating either some 
or a lot in financial decisions.  
 
Measures of Food Assistance 
In descriptive tables, I tabulate use of food assistance. I include the major means-tested federal 
programs designed to address nutrition and food adequacy, including the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP), the Special Supplemental Program for Women, Infants, and 
Children (WIC), free or reduced price School Lunch (NSLP), and free or reduced price School 
Breakfast (NSBP). I also include use of the charitable emergency food system, which includes 
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food received from a church, food pantry, or food bank. SNAP and emergency food receipt are 
both measured over the past 12 months while WIC, NSLP, and NSBP are measured over the past 
30 days. Examining participation in these programs is informative in understanding both the size 
of the population currently reached by the food safety net and to the population with otherwise 
unobservable characteristics that require assistance in meeting their food needs. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the full sample of households with children and sub-samples of 
households by bank account ownership and AFS use are presented in Table 1. Column 1 presents 
the full sample, while Columns 2 and 3 divides the sample by banked status and Columns 4 and 
5 divide the sample by use of any AFS product (non-bank check casher, non-bank money order, 
payday loan, pawn loan, rent-to-own agreement, or RAL). Overall, unbanked households and 
users of AFS products appear similar in terms of demographic characteristics. The economic 
characteristics of the unbanked suggest more severe hardship than users of AFS products. 
 
Looking at the sample as a whole, the primary earner is, on average, 40 years old and the oldest 
child is 10 years old. Consistent with the literature, unbanked households and those that use AFS 
products are slightly younger (36 years old and 39 years old, respectively). The age of the oldest 
child is approximately the same, indicating that the unbanked and AFS customers were parents 
earlier in life than other households. While the majority of the overall sample (69.0 percent) 
consists of households with married parents. The unbanked and households that use AFS 
products are significantly less likely to be married, suggesting that there are fewer adults in the 
household to pool financial resources to manage an economic shock. 
 
Among all households with children, household heads tend to be white (78.8 percent), native-
born U.S. citizens (82.3 percent). Less than one fifth (17.5 percent) of the overall sample of 
households is headed by a Hispanic. Both the unbanked and users of AFS products, however, are 
much more likely to be non-white (41.0 percent of the unbanked and 24.7 percent of AFS users), 
non-native citizens (29.0 percent of the unbanked and 13.9 percent of AFS users), and Hispanic 
(37.7 percent of the unbanked and 19.8 percent of AFS users).  
 
Less than one-third (28.8 percent) of primary earners in the overall sample have only a high 
school degree or less and nearly one-third (31.9 percent) attended some college even if they did 
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not receive a four-year degree. The unbanked are disproportionately concentrated among those 
with less educational attainment. Almost one-third (30.6 percent) of the unbanked have the 
primary earner with less than a high school degree and another 40.7 percent earned a high school 
degree as their highest educational level. Users of AFS products also have lower educational 
attainment than the overall sample, although the differences are not as stark. Slightly more than 
one-third (38.3 percent) of the sample of AFS users obtained a high school degree or less as their 
highest educational attainment. 
 
Employment of the primary earner and household income levels are consistent with these 
educational attainment levels. In the overall sample, 84.0 percent of households have the primary 
earner employed full-time and the remaining households are fairly evenly divided between part-
time earners, the unemployed, and others not in the labor force. But, less than half (49.5 percent) 
of unbanked households have the primary earner employed full-time. Instead, primary earners in 
unbanked households are much more likely to be employed part-time (13.0 percent) or not 
working, either due to unemployment, disability, retirement or other reasons. AFS users have 
higher rates of full-time employment (78.7 percent) than the unbanked but lower rates than the 
overall sample. Part-time employment (7.0 percent) and unemployment (6.2 percent) for AFS 
users is slightly greater than the overall sample. 
 
Although 15.1 percent of households have incomes at or below poverty, the majority (58.9 
percent) of households have incomes greater than 185 percent of the federal poverty line, a level 
that makes these households ineligible for SNAP. The unbanked and AFS users are concentrated 
among households with lower incomes. Both unbanked households and AFS users are 
significantly more likely to live at or below the federal poverty level (58.7 percent and 23.0 
percent, respectively). 
 
In Table 2, I present demographic and economic characteristics for the subsample of households 
with more than one adult. For this subsample of households with children, the CPS asked 
questions about the extent of sharing of household finances and the respondent’s participation in 
household financial decisions. The first column of Table 2 provides the characteristics for all 
households with more than one adult, columns 2 through 5 provides characteristics by the extent 
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of sharing of household financial resources, and columns 6 through 8 provides the characteristics 
by the respondent’s report of participation in financial decisions of the household.  
 
The first two rows of Table 2 indicate if the respondent in the December 2008 CPS was the same 
as the respondent in the January 2009 CPS. In a large majority (78.5 percent) of households with 
more than one adult, the same adult responded in both December and January. This is important 
because adults in the household may differ as to how they interpret child behaviors and/or may 
be more knowledgeable about financial affairs. The portion of the sample with the same 
respondent is generally similar, regardless of the extent of financial resource sharing or the 
amount of participation in financial decisions of the household.  In approximately half (51.3 
percent) of households with more than one adult, the same female responded to both December 
and January.  
 
In terms of demographic characteristics, the primary earner in these households is slightly more 
than 40 years old and the oldest child is approximately 10 years old. More than three-quarters of 
households with more than one adult are married couples (78.2 percent) and headed by white 
(80.9 percent) adults that are non-Hispanic (82.4 percent).  These households are more likely to 
have a college degree (41.9 percent), the primary earner employed full-time (87.7 percent) and 
have household income greater than 185 percent of poverty (62.1 percent). 
 
The less sharing of finances within the household, the less similar these households look to the 
overall sample. Lack of sharing of financial resources occurs in households where the adults are 
not married (61.7 percent) and non-white households, either African American non-Hispanics 
(13.2 percent) or Hispanic (15.8 percent). Additionally, maintaining separate finances is much 
more likely to occur in households with lower levels of educational attainment and lower levels 
of income. More than one-third (34.4 percent) of households maintaining separate finances have 
a high school degree or less and, possibly as a result, 21.1 percent of these households live at or 
below the poverty level. 
 
Finally, in Columns 6 through 8, I examine characteristics of households with more than one 
adult by their participation in financial decisions for the household. In general, households that 
report a lot of participation appear different than those with no participation, while those with 
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some participation have characteristics between these groups. Households where the respondent 
reports no participation in financial decisions tend to have slightly older primary earners (41.5 
years old versus 40.6 years old for those with a lot of participation) and older children (11.8 
years old versus 10.1 years old for those with a lot of participation). Compared to respondents 
that report a lot of participation, respondents that report no participation are less likely to be 
married (76.2 percent versus 87.0 percent), more likely to be non-white (23.0 percent versus 16.5 
percent) or Hispanic (26.6 percent versus 14.4 percent), and significantly more likely to be non-
native born adults (40.1 percent versus 16.0 percent). Households where the respondent indicates 
no participation have lower levels of educational attainment, and more likely to be in or near 
poverty than those with no participation (18.0 percent versus 9.5 percent) despite similar rates of 
employment. 
 
RESULTS 
Use of Mainstream and Alternative Financial Products 
I examine the relationship between financial decisions related to the types of financial products 
used by households and food security outcomes for children with descriptive results. Table 3 
presents simple tabulations of these decisions, food security, and use of food assistance programs 
for all households with children. Column 1 of Table 3 shows the food insecurity rate of children 
at 10.6 percent, with 1.3 percent of households with children classified as very low food secure. 
This estimate is nearly identical to the 11.0 percent estimated food insecurity and 1.3 percent 
very low food security rates among children in 2008 (Coleman-Jensen et al. 2012). The small 
differences reflect the sample for this analysis includes a smaller sample of households from the 
December 2008 CPS who were also interviewed in the January 2009 CPS. 
 
Comparing food insecurity rates across households that made different choices regarding the 
types of financial products, shows that unbanked households (Column 3) are much more likely to 
contain children with very low food security or low food security than banked households 
(Column 2). Among all unbanked households, 28.8 percent of households contain food insecure 
children, including 4.6 percent with very low food security. This compares to the 8.7 percent of 
banked households containing food insecure children, including 1.0 percent with very low food 
security. These simple comparisons suggest a large relationship between bank account ownership 
and food insecurity among children. 
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The January 2009 CPS provides further detail on the relationship that unbanked households have 
with banks. I divide unbanked households into those that were previously banked but currently 
unbanked (Column 4) and those households that never owned a bank account (Column 5). 
Previously banked households exhibit higher rates of food insecurity and very low food security 
among children than households that were never banked. In fact, previously banked households 
have a 5.5 percent rate of very low food security among children (Column 4) while never banked 
households show a 3.3 percent rate of very low food security among children (Column 5). While 
the never banked still exhibit high rates of very low food security, the increased prevalence 
among previously banked households could indicate that these households experienced an 
economic shock that both led to the loss of a bank account and increased the risk of food 
insecurity and very low food security. 
 
In Columns 6 and 7, I compare households by their choice to use any AFS product (non-bank 
check casher, non-bank money order, payday lender, pawn shop, rent-to-own outlet, or RAL). 
Households that ever used any AFS product exhibit higher rates of food insecurity and very low 
food security among children than households that did not ever use any AFS product. 
Households that ever used any AFS product (Column 6) have a 16.3 percent rate of child food 
insecurity and a 2.0 percent rate of very low food security. This compares to a 6.6 percent rate of 
child food insecurity, including a 0.1 percent rate of very low food security, for households that 
never used any AFS product. While these rates are lower than the rates for the unbanked and, 
especially the previously banked, they are greater than the sample of households overall. 
 
Next, I examine outcomes related to the use of food assistance. Among all households with 
children, 13.9 percent report receiving SNAP in the last 12 months, 8.5 percent report receiving 
WIC in the past 30 days, 20.6 percent report receiving reduced or free School Meals in the past 
30 days, and 15.5 percent report receiving the national School Breakfast program in the past 30 
days. The higher receipt rates for SNAP rather than other nutritional assistance programs may be 
due to the lack of age restrictions on children to receive as SNAP. Few households (5.4 percent) 
utilized non-profit, emergency food programs. 
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Compared to the overall population of households with children, the unbanked and those that 
ever used an AFS product are significantly more likely to use food assistance programs. More 
than half of the unbanked (52.6 percent) received SNAP in the last 12 months whereas only 9.8 
percent of the banked received SNAP. An even greater percentage of the previously banked 
(56.2 percent) received SNAP in the last 12 months. Receipt of other nutritional assistance is 
also high for the unbanked, including free or reduced price School Meals (52.9 percent School 
Lunch and 44.3 percent School Breakfast) and WIC receipt (25.6 percent) in the last 30 days. 
Compared to banked households, the unbanked are more than three times as likely to receive 
WIC and School Meals. Highlighting the financial vulnerabilities that unbanked household face, 
16.6 percent of unbanked households report receiving emergency food in the last 12 months 
compared to 4.2 percent of the banked. 
 
Households that ever used an AFS product are more likely to receive food assistance than those 
that never used AFS products. However, users of AFS products have lower participation rates 
than unbanked households. Nearly one-quarter of households that ever used an AFS product 
(23.0 percent) received SNAP in the last 12 months versus 7.6 percent of those that never used 
an AFS product. Receipt of other nutritional assistance programs is also greater than those that 
never used AFS products. 
 
In these simple cross-tabulations, households that chose to not own a bank account appear more 
likely to face very low food insecurity among children and to use food assistance programs to 
meet their food needs. Previously banked households appear the worst off. Households that ever 
used AFS products also appear to face food-related distress, although not to the extent as the 
unbanked or previously banked. These relationships could reflect other characteristics of the 
households. I explore how these choices affect child food security, controlling for other aspects 
of the household with a regression, beginning with the decision to own a bank account. 
 
Decision to Own a Bank Account 
I estimate the correlation between food security of children and owning a bank account, 
controlling for observable characteristics of households using Equation 14. In Column 1 of Table 
4, an unbanked household is correlated with an increase in the probability of very low food 
security among children of 1.7 percentage points. With 1.3 percent of the overall sample 
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classified as households with very low food security among children, the magnitude is quite 
large. The point estimate, however, is not statistically significant. 
 
Because Table 3 indicated that differences exist between households previously unbanked and 
those never banked, I break the unbanked into these categories (with banked households serving 
as the omitted group). In Column 2, relative to banked households, no correlation exists between 
never owning a bank account and very low food security among children. However, previously 
banked households are correlated with a significant increased probability of very low food 
security among children of 2.6 percentage points. The magnitude of this relationship suggests a 
dramatic association between these who no longer having a bank account and childhood hunger. 
 
In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4, the same models are estimated for the child food insecurity 
outcome. A significant association is shown between not owning a bank account and child food 
insecurity of 4.6 percentage points (Column 3). But, as Column 4 shows, this appears driven by 
the relationship between the previously banked and child food insecurity. No significant or 
important relationship is seen between the never banked and child food insecurity. But, if a 
household was previously banked, it is associated with a statistically significant, 8.3 percentage 
point increase in the likelihood of child food insecurity. 
 
To put the magnitude of these estimates in perspective, a recent estimate for the effect of SNAP 
receipt suggest that SNAP receipt is associated with a reduction of 30 percent in food insecurity 
and 20 percent for very low food security (Ratcliffe et al., 2011). With the child food insecurity 
rate in the sample at 10.6 percent, when parents close a bank account or have the bank account 
closed on their behalf, it is associated with a 78.3 percent increase in the probability of child food 
insecurity. While not causal, the differences in the relationship between the formerly banked and 
never banked are somewhat surprising. One possible explanation could be unobservable 
economic shocks to the household that may affect both bank account ownership and child food 
security. 
 
To understand why the previously banked exhibit such high correlations with child food 
insecurity, Table 5 presents the time since these households owned an account (Columns 1 and 
2). Households previously banked sometime during the past year would have been banked during 
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at least some portion of the time food security over the past year was measured. An account 
closure within the year could represent a recent economic shock that could also cause an increase 
in very low child food security and child food insecurity. But, households unbanked for less than 
a year look similar to households unbanked for more than a year in terms of child food security. 
The very low food security among children is virtually identical (5.8 percent and 5.3 percent) but 
low food security rates are slightly higher for households that owned an account within the last 
year (29.8 percent) than those that were banked more than one year ago (25.6 percent).  
 
In terms of use of food assistance, households that owned an account sometime during the last 
year have lower rates of participation in all food assistance programs despite slightly higher rates 
of child food insecurity. This could suggest that previously banked households that were more 
recently banked may either be less likely to be eligible for food assistance or unaware of their 
eligibility. Lower rates of receipt of emergency food programs, where there are likely no income 
requirements, provides greater support for the former explanation because there tend not to be 
income requirements to use these food assistance sources. In sum, only the slightly greater rates 
of low food security provide support for a common shock causes both child food insecurity and 
unbanked status. 
 
In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5, I divide the previously banked by who closed the account: a 
member of the household or the bank. A customer closing a bank account could mean that 
household preferences or lack of financial education to understand the benefits of owning an 
account are important in explaining outcomes for the previously banked. In contrast, when banks 
close an account, it typically signifies account inactivity, frequent account over withdrawals, or 
other instances of fraud.  Overall, 81 percent of previously banked households report closing the 
account themselves and 19 percent reported the bank close the account for them. Although not 
statistically significant due to a small sample size, households that closed their account 
experience lower rates of very low food security among children than those where the bank 
closed the account (5.4 percent and 9.4 percent, respectively). Larger and statistically significant 
differences exist for low food security. The portion of the sample of households where the bank 
closed the account have approximately twice as large low food security rates as households that 
closed the account themselves.  
 
28 
 
Additionally, households that report the bank closed the account show significantly higher 
participation rates in SNAP (69.8 percent of those where the bank closed the account versus 54.2 
percent of those closing the account themselves), as well as significantly higher reports of receipt 
of emergency food programs (34.4 percent of households where the bank closed the account and 
18.8 percent of households that closed the account themselves). Previously banked households 
that had the bank close their account also show higher rates of receipt of other food assistance 
programs. Coupled with higher rates of child food insecurity among this sample, the more 
intense use of food assistance programs provides suggestive evidence that financial problems and 
lack of financial management skills may explain the relationship between the previously banked 
and child food insecurity. 
 
To investigate this explanation in Table 6, I control for observable characteristics with a 
regression but break up the formerly banked into two different ways: time since the household 
owned the account (Columns 1 and 2) and who closed the account (Columns 3 and 4). All 
estimates in Table 6 are reported relative to the currently banked. Examining households with 
very low food security in Column 1, point estimates for the formerly banked are positive but 
insignificant for both households that were banked within the last year and those banked more 
than one year ago. No relationship exists between the never banked and very low food insecurity.  
 
In Column 2 of Table 6, I examine the child food insecurity outcome. Positive and significant 
point estimates are shown for both types of previously banked households. Previously banked 
households that were banked within the last year are associated with a 12.9 percentage point 
increase in child food insecurity while previously banked households that were banked more 
than one year ago are associated with a 6.2 percentage point increase in child food insecurity. 
While these estimates are not statistically different from one another, households that closed their 
account with the last year are significantly different from the never banked. 
 
Estimates for who closed the account are also included in Table 6. Compared to the currently 
banked, the previously banked that closed their account themselves are positively but not 
significantly related to very low food security among children (Column 3). The relationship for 
the formerly banked that had the bank close their account on very low food security among 
children is still insignificant but the point estimate is larger at 5.8 percentage point increase.  
29 
 
 
In Column 4, I examine child food insecurity and find larger and significant relationships. 
Previously banked households that closed the account themselves are related to a significant 
increased probability of child food insecurity of 5.6 percentage points. However, previously 
banked households that had the bank close the account are associated with a 23.1 percentage 
point increase in food insecurity among children, compared to the banked. Not only is the 
magnitude of the effect striking – a more than 200 percent increase in this likelihood – these 
point estimates are significantly different from one another. Households where the bank closed 
the account differ from households that closed the account themselves in terms of child food 
insecurity. Thus, economic shocks and financial management skills both remain a likely 
explanation of the observed behavior. 
 
In sum, the relationship between owning a bank account and food insecurity among children is 
strongest for the previously banked, rather than the entire population of the unbanked. Moreover, 
this effect is strongest for those who more recently closed the account and for those that 
experienced the bank closing the account. With the negative stigma associated with a bank 
closing the account and, therefore, likely misreporting of who closed the account, these 
relationships could be lower bound estimates. This suggests that targeting of food assistance to 
reach these households may reduce very low food security among children.  
 
To gain further insight into why households that had a bank account at one time exit the banking 
sector, I tabulate self-reported reasons the unbanked do not own an account. In Columns 1 
through 4 of Table 7, I report the main reason why previously banked households who closed 
their account gave for doing so. I group responses into four reasons: economic, financial 
management skills, customer service, and other reasons to examine the underlying cause the 
household cites for not owning an account.  
 
For previously banked households that closed their account, a near majority (45.5 percent) 
indicated the main reason for exiting the banking system fell into “other” reasons (Column 4) 
and another large portion (38.8 percent) provided economic reasons for closing their account. 
These “other” reasons include including not writing enough checks, reporting they did not need 
or want a bank account, and write-in reasons. Economic reasons include high minimum balance 
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requirements, high service charges, or too little money for an account. The remaining households 
were categorized as financial management skills (8.2 percent) and customer service (7.5 percent) 
reasons. Thus, idiosyncratic preferences, followed by indicating the costs of a bank account or 
their own economic constraints, are behind many of these decisions. 
 
To see how child food insecurity and very low food security relate to these reasons, I examine 
child food security status. Somewhat surprisingly, the highest rates of child food insecurity are 
among the 15.7 percent of these households that don’t cite economic or other reasons. Nearly 
one-third (32.4 percent) of households that report financial management skills (Column 2) with 
owning a bank account experienced child food insecurity, including 13.1 percent of children with 
very low food security. These financial management skills include reports that they could not 
manage or balance a bank account, experiencing too many overdrafts or bouncing too many 
checks, or banks taking too long to clear checks.  
 
Although no household that reported customer service reasons (Column 3) for closing their 
account experienced very low food security among children, these households were actually the 
most likely to face child food insecurity because a majority (53.0 percent) contain children with 
low food security. These high rates are surprising as customer service reasons, including 
inconvenient hours or location, language barriers, lack of trust or comfort with banks, or not 
offering desired services like check cashing, seem the least related to difficulties in affording 
adequate food. Broadening the reasons to all possible reasons for closing the account rather than 
the main reason, however, does find evidence of financial constraints among those citing 
customer service reasons. These include minimum balance requirements (24.9 percent), service 
charges (34.0 percent), not enough money (27.2 percent), didn’t need or want a bank account 
(38.0 percent), or didn’t trust banks (42.5 percent). 
 
The two most popular reasons for closing the account, economic and other, show the lowest rates 
of child food insecurity of all these households (23.4 percent and 27.7 percent, respectively), 
even if these and very low food security rates are still quite high. Among the previously banked 
that closed their account citing economic reasons (Column 1), 6.0 percent experienced very low 
food security. Respondents categorized as providing other reasons why they closed their account, 
including not writing enough checks to make it worthwhile, believing they did not need or want 
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a bank account, or write-in reasons (Column 4), had a 4.7 percent rate of very low food security 
among children. These households have higher rates of low food security (23.0 percent) than 
other households that closed their account but slightly lower rates of very low food security (4.7 
percent) than other households. 
 
In Columns 5 through 8 of Table 7, I tabulate the main reasons the never banked gave for not 
own an account. I again categorize these reasons into four groups: economic reasons (Column 5), 
financial management skills (Column 6), customer service (Column 7), and other (Column 8). 
Overall, most never banked households report that they are unbanked due to economic reasons 
(52.8 percent), primarily (79.7 percent) because believe they do not have enough money to need 
a bank account. Unbanked household citing economic reasons also have the highest rates of child 
food insecurity with approximately one-third (33.2 percent) of households with child food 
insecurity, including 3.1 percent with very low food security among children.  
 
Only 10.7 percent of never banked households report the main reason pertains to financial 
management reasons (inability to manage or balance a bank account, lack of knowledge about 
how to open a bank account, credit problems that prevent the opening of an account, not seeing 
the value of having a bank account, or bouncing too many checks or making too many overdrafts 
for an account). However, these households have the highest rates of very low food security 
among children (6.9 percent) of all never banked households and high rates child food insecurity 
(30.9 percent). 
 
The lowest rates of food insecurity among children (12.6 percent) are among respondents that 
reporting not ever owning a bank account due to customer service reasons (inconvenient hours or 
locations, language barriers, lack of trust or comfort in banks, or lack of services, like check 
cashing, that they demand). Low rates of food insecurity for this sub-sample are in marked 
contrast to the high rates of food insecurity among children for the previously banked that closed 
their account for customer service reasons. Unlike those previously banked due to customer 
service reasons, the never banked households may have the financial skills themselves to manage 
their finances but choose to not own an account because of personal distaste for the banking 
industry.  
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Approximately one fifth of the never banked population (20.1 percent) report other reasons for 
not owning an account. These include not writing enough checks to make a bank account 
worthwhile (15.2 percent of this group), lack of proper documentation (14.9 percent of this 
group), inability to choose a single reason, or volunteering another answer. These never banked 
households exhibit high rates of food insecurity among children (17.2 percent), but relatively low 
rates of very low food security (2.6 percent). 
 
Can State Banking Policies Affect These Relationships? 
The discussion thus far finds examines correlations between the parent’s current ownership of a 
bank account or the parent’s history of bank account ownership and child food security. For 
crafting policies to address childhood hunger, ideally we would like to know if exiting the formal 
financial sector causes an increase in child food insecurity or if it indicates another aspect of the 
household and its economic environment. Evidence presented thus far on the types of unbanked 
households that experience very low food security among children and reasons why these 
households chose to not own an account gives support to the idea that a common economic 
shock causes both unbanked status and child food insecurity. 
 
While a variety of federal, state, and local policies exist to “bank the unbanked”, none of these 
work well as an instrument, in part, because policymakers have had little success in boosting 
bank account ownership rates (Prescott and Tatar, 1999).4
                                                          
4 The nature of the CPS also makes the task of finding strong instruments more difficult. The cross-sectional data 
makes it impossible to utilize federal policies because all households were affected while new state and local 
policies that could affect the banking decision occurred after the January 2009 data was collected and variation in 
banking policies across localities would be difficult to measure in the public use version of the CPS. 
 Instead of a 2SLS approach, I examine 
if state-level policies can affect the relationship between the formerly banked and child food 
security. Based on work by Washington (2006), I examine two state-level policies: lifeline 
legislation and the regulation of check cashing services. Because lifeline legislation should lower 
the cost of bank account ownership, it should make it less likely that households close their bank 
account. Assuming households are relatively price inelastic, as Caskey (1991) suggests, states 
that regulate non-bank check cashers will reduce the supply of non-back check cashers and bank 
account ownership will for households to remain in the formal financial system to receive basic 
financial services. Household decisions to be banked and use non-bank check cashers are made 
jointly (Rhine et al. 2006). 
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In Table 8, I explore these relationships by interacting these state policies with the detailed 
variable of banking status. In Columns 1 and 2, I examine very low food security among 
children. Compared to banked households, in states without lifeline legislation, the formerly 
banked have a 2.6 percentage point increase in the probability of very low food security. In states 
that don’t regulate check cashers, the formerly banked have a statistically insignificant 3.8 
percentage point increase in very low food security, compared to the banked. In Columns 3 and 
4, I repeat the analysis for the child food insecurity variable. The pattern of estimates is similar 
but coefficient estimates are larger: a statistically significant 8.8 percentage point increase in the 
probability of food insecurity for the formerly banked in states without lifeline legislation and a 
statistically insignificant increase of 6.6 percentage points in the probability of food insecurity 
for the formerly banked in states that don’t regulate check cashers. 
 
In sum, while policymakers have had difficulty in increasing bank account ownership rates, 
states policies do appear to be correlated with keeping households in the financial system and 
reduce the risk of very low food security and food insecurity among children. This suggests 
ensuring that households remain connected to financial system, particularly during economic 
shocks. 
 
Alternative Financial Services 
Next, I consider decisions related to the use of AFS products. Because the simple cross-
tabulations of AFS product use and child food security, shown in Table 3, show a large 
correlation between AFS product use and food insecurity,  I begin with regressions that estimate 
the relationship between use of any AFS products and very low food security among children, 
controlling for observable characteristics of the household. Then, the types of AFS products and 
the frequency of use will be examined in detail. 
 
As shown in Table 9, ever using any AFS product (non-bank check casher, non-bank money 
order, pawn loan, payday loan, rent-to-own contract, or RAL) has no statistical or economic 
correlation with very low food security among children. The point estimate is small and 
insignificant.  In Column 2, I measure AFS products ever used as a continuous measure. When 
AFS products are measured continuously, each additional AFS product is significantly correlated 
with an increased probability of very low food security among children of 0.6 percentage points. 
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Although this effect appears small, given that only 1.3 percent of households overall contain 
children with very low food security, the estimate is relatively large. Each additional AFS 
product increases the prevalence of very low food security by 50 percent. 
 
In Columns 3 and 4, I investigate the effect of AFS product use on child food insecurity. 
Measured as a dichotomous variable, ever using any AFS product is associated with a significant 
increase in the probability of child food insecurity of 4.5 percentage points. When AFS product 
use is measured continuously, each additional AFS product the household ever used increases the 
probability of child food insecurity by 3.9 percentage points. These correlations between AFS 
product use and child food security measures suggest that using AFS products is associated with 
declines in child well-being.  
 
I examine use of these products in greater detail, beginning with use of each of these products 
individually Table 10. Each column presents cross-tabulations of someone in the household ever 
using the product, with the exception of the RAL decision which refers to the last 5 years. 
Among those ever using any AFS product, the products most likely to have been used are those 
that provide basic financial transaction services: non-bank check cashing (Column 1) and non-
bank money orders (Column 2). Almost one-third (31.4 percent) of users of any AFS product 
had ever used a check casher while 79.7 percent of users of any AFS product had ever used a 
non-bank money order. Use of AFS products that provide credit – payday loans, pawn loans, 
rent-to-own agreements, and RALs – are much lower with 13.2 percent, 17.0 percent, 14.0 
percent, and 14.1 percent of AFS users reporting the use of these products, respectively. 
Although usage rates for unbanked households are greater than for banked households, a large 
portion of banked households report using these services at one time.  
 
Next, I examine simple comparisons of child food security outcomes by households that ever 
used each specific AFS product. Despite fewer households reporting use of AFS products that 
provide credit, rates of very low food security for users of AFS products for financial transaction 
services are nearly twice as high as users of AFS products for credit. For AFS products that 
provide basic financial transaction services, household that report ever using non-bank check 
cashing services exhibit nearly the same rates of very low food security among children (2.5 
percent) as households that ever used money orders (2.0 percent). However, rates of low food 
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security for users of non-bank check cashing services are approximately six percentage points 
higher than users of non-bank money orders (20.2 percent compared to 14.4 percent).  
 
For AFS products providing credit, very low food security rates are high but low food security 
rates are only slightly higher than those of AFS products for financial transactions. Rates of very 
low food child security are 3.5 percent for payday loans (Column 3), 5.1 percent for pawn loans 
(Column 4), 3.0 percent for rent-to-own agreements (Column 5), and 4.0 percent for RALs 
(Column 6). Rates of low food security for households that report ever using these credit 
products, range from 21.1 percent for rent-to-own agreements to 23.1 percent for households that 
ever used a pawn shop. The greater prevalence of food insecurity for users of credit products 
than for users of financial transaction products could indicate that households with child food 
insecurity have insufficient access to credit and need high-cost, short-term credit. Or, it could 
suggest that use of these AFS credit product cause child food insecurity. 
 
Examining food assistance, however, suggests less dramatic differences across users of different 
types of AFS products. For example, use of SNAP during the past year is in the range of 20 to 30 
percent across all types of AFS products. Relatively low levels of SNAP participation are 
surprising, given the high prevalence of low food security among children, suggest that these 
households are either ineligible for SNAP, unaware of their eligibility for SNAP, or the level of 
SNAP benefits is inadequate. The section presents more detail on AFS products providing 
transaction services before examining AFS products providing credit. 
 
 
AFS Products Providing Basic Financial Transactions 
Because the questions in the CPS largely relate to households ever using these products, I 
examine the reported frequency of use of AFS products providing financial transactions. 
Respondents indicating someone in the household uses these services at least a few times a year 
or once or twice a year are more likely to have used these products over the same time period 
food security was measured. In contrast, those reporting they almost never used these products 
would be less likely be customers of these providers over the last 12 months.  
 
I present the frequency of basic financial transactions in Table 11. Columns 1 through 3 include 
the reported frequency of use for non-bank check cashing services among households responding 
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they ever used a non-bank check casher. The majority (54.0 percent) of users of non-bank check 
cashers used these services at least a few times a year while roughly 20 percent of users only 
report using non-bank check cashers once or twice a year. Only one quarter (25.9 percent) almost 
never used these services. 
 
Columns 4 through 6 present the frequency of use of non-bank money orders for those reporting 
they ever used a non-bank money order. Households that report ever using non-bank money 
orders are less likely to be regular users than users of non-bank check cashing services. Less than 
half (43. 4 percent) of households that ever used a non-bank money order do so at least a few 
times a year and approximately one quarter use non-bank money orders once or twice a year. 
One-third (32.8 percent) of these households report almost never using these services.  
 
Child food security levels also in Table 11, in general, show that frequency of use of these 
services is positively associated with prevalence of very low food security and food insecurity 
among children. Roughly three percent of households that report using a check casher at least 
once or twice a year have very low food secure children  and approximately 20 percent have 
children with low food security (Columns 1 and 2). Households that almost never use non-bank 
check cashing show far lower rates of food insecurity among children with 0.4 percent of 
households experiencing very low child food security (Column 3). For households that ever use 
non-bank money orders, 3.0 percent of households that use a non-bank money order at least a 
few times a year have children with very low food security (Column 4) and less than one percent 
(0.8 percent) of households that almost never use non-bank money orders have children with 
very low food security (Column 6).  
 
Consistent with these food security outcomes, use of food assistance programs rises with more 
frequent use of both non-bank check cashers and non-bank money orders. For example, 38.4 
percent of households using non-bank check cashing services at least a few times a year receive 
SNAP benefits while only 20.8 percent of households that almost never use non-bank check 
cashing service receive SNAP benefits. Similarly, 36.8 percent of households that use non-bank 
money orders at least a few times a year receive SNAP benefits while only 9.5 percent of 
households that almost never utilize non-money orders.  
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I control for observable characteristics by estimating Equation 14. Estimates are provided for 
both ever using a non-bank check casher or non-bank money order and the frequency of their use 
in Table 12. Looking specifically at financial transaction products, rather than all AFS products, 
shows no relationship between the number of these financial transaction products used and very 
low food security among children (Column 1). The point estimate is both small and statistically 
insignificant.  
 
Next, non-bank check cashers and non-bank money orders are examined separately to determine 
the size of the relevant relationship on very low food security among children. Neither the use of 
a non-bank check casher nor a non-bank money order (Columns 2 and 3) has any important 
statistical or economic relationship with very low food security. In Columns 4 and 5, I treat 
households that report “almost never” using these products similarly to those that never used 
these products. This parameterization is more likely to measure use of these products over the 
same period as the food security measure. But, as before, there is no significant or important 
relationship between use of these AFS products and very low food security. 
 
In the remaining columns of Table 12, I repeat the analysis but examine food insecurity among 
children. In these estimates, the effect of each of these products is positive and statistically 
significant. Ever using either AFS financial transaction products is associated with a significant 
3.6 percentage point increase in food insecurity among children (Column 6). Ever using a check 
casher is significantly associated with an increased probability of food insecurity of children of 
nearly 7 percentage points (Column 7) while ever using a non-bank money order is associated 
with a significant increase in food insecurity of 3.5 percentage points (Column 8). Finally, in 
Columns 9 and 10, “almost never” users are treated as those who never used either of these 
products. The estimated effects for both non-bank check cashers and non-bank money orders are 
similar to earlier estimates with a 7.1 percentage point and 4.3 percentage point increase for non-
bank check cashers and non-bank money orders, respectively. Thus, it does not appear as if 
treating rare users of these products similar to regular users of these products produces 
substantial bias.5
                                                          
5 I also investigated the frequency of use more directly with a series of indicators for the reported frequency of use. 
There is little relationship between the frequency of use of either non-bank check cashing services or non-bank 
money orders and very low food security of children. But, compared to those that report never using a non-bank 
check casher, any frequency of use is significantly and positively related to food insecurity of children. Point 
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The differences in these findings when examining very low food security among children and 
child food insecurity could be explained by the relatively low cost of these services. Perhaps fees 
for these products are not large enough to produce an outcome as extreme as very low food 
security but could cause a shift to food insecurity. The larger point estimates for non-bank check 
cashers compared to non-bank money orders may be the result of non-bank check cashing 
services existing more on the “fringe” of financial services. Many adults required a money order 
at one time to secure an apartment or pay a bill. In fact, available at U.S. Post Office branches 
and convenience stores, non-bank money orders are available in neighborhoods in all 
sociodemographic levels.  
 
Still, the relationship between food security and use of AFS products that provide basic financial 
transactions is somewhat puzzling because these products are often freely provided with a bank 
account. Moreover, although I estimate that unbanked households are 28 percentage points more 
likely to use a non-bank check cashing services and 20 percentage points more likely to use a 
non-bank money order, both banked and unbanked households use these products. If use of these 
products among unbanked households has any important relationship on the risk of child food 
insecurity, it suggests that children in these households may be better off if their parent owned a 
bank account. If banked households utilize these services and it affects the probability of child 
food insecurity, it suggests poor financial management skills, bank accounts that are inadequate 
for their needs, high transportation costs to travel to a bank, or a need for liquidity that the 
immediate clearing of the check would provide. 
 
I explore if differences exist between banked and unbanked households in the relationship 
between the use of AFS transactional products and child food security outcomes in Table 13. I 
find that for unbanked households, the relationship between the use of non-bank check cashers, 
non-bank money orders, and either food security outcome is statistically insignificant. Positive 
and statistically significant relationships, however, are found among the sample of banked 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
estimates range from 5.7 points for at least a few times per year to 10.3 points for once or twice a year to 5.5 points 
for almost never. None of these point estimates on the frequency of use are statistically different. For non-bank 
money orders, frequency of more than at least once or twice a year is significantly related to food insecurity, on the 
order of 3.6 to 5.2 percentage points. The point estimates between at once or twice a year and at least a few times a 
year do not significantly differ. These results are available from the author. 
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households for the food insecurity outcome. The estimated relationship between non-bank 
money orders and child food insecurity outcomes is smaller than the relationship for check 
cashers. While the coefficient estimates are not significantly different between banked and 
unbanked households for each outcome, the number of unbanked households is relatively small. 
 
In sum, this provides weak evidence that for unbanked households, use of these products is 
unrelated to declining food security levels of children. One explanation for the effects on banked 
households is that use of these providers for banked households is indicative of liquidity 
constraints. Banked households may use a non-bank check casher so they can get their money 
faster, given the holds that banks may place on a deposited check, particularly for households 
with a history of overdrawing their account or otherwise poor credit. Or, households may have 
poor financial skills and do not optimally utilize services provided by banks. Finally, 
convenience could be another reason for use of these services. If a bank branch is not located 
close to where the respondent lives or works, the costs of transportation to a bank branch 
location may be high and the respondent may choose a check casher instead. 
 
To explore these possible explanations I examine the main reason households report using 
financial transaction services at an AFS provider rather than at a bank into three possible 
reasons: economic, customer service, and other reasons. In Table 14, columns 1 through 3 
provide tabulations of these reasons for non-bank check cashing services. For non-bank check 
cashers, the main reason for choosing this provider was evenly split between customer service 
reasons (45.9 percent) and economic reasons (44.1 percent). Ten percent of household 
volunteered another reason. Customer service reasons include convenience, fewer identification 
requirements and greater comfort with non-bank providers. Economic reasons include not 
owning a bank account, an immediate need to access the funds from the check, and the prices 
charged to cash checks at a bank.  
 
Compared to those citing customer service reasons, households providing economic reasons for 
using a check casher rather than a bank have higher rates of very low food security among 
children (3.6 percent versus 1.5 percent) and higher rates of child food insecurity (25.2 percent 
versus 16.4 percent). Greater participation in SNAP and other food assistance among households 
that cite economic reasons suggest that households relying on check cashers for economic 
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reasons are facing greater financial constraints. Thus, it seems likely for banked consumers using 
a non-bank check casher, liquidity constraints are important reasons for their food hardship. 
 
Columns 4 through 6 of Table 14 provide tabulations of these reasons for non-bank money 
orders. Among this subsample, two-thirds of households use these providers rather than a bank 
due to customer service reasons (66.6 percent), including banks not selling money orders, 
convenience, and comfort. Far fewer households (23.2 percent) chose these services for the price 
charged by banks, the only economic reason households could cite. The remaining users of non-
bank money orders (10.3 percent) volunteered another reason. As in the case of households that 
ever used a non-bank check casher, compared to households citing customer service reasons, 
households that ever chose to purchase a non-bank money order because of economic reasons 
exhibit higher rates of low child food security (18.3 percent versus 12.9 percent) and very low 
child food security (3.4 percent versus 1.5 percent). However, households that report prices for 
money orders as the main reason they chose to purchase this at a non-bank do have slightly 
higher rates of SNAP participation (29.6 percent versus 21.7 percent) and other food assistance 
programs. 
 
AFS Products Providing Credit 
I turn next to explore the effects of AFS products that provide credit on child food security in 
greater detail. These products include payday loans, pawn loans, rent-to-own agreements, and 
RALs. Recall from Table 10 that the simple cross-tabulations suggest that use of these products 
is associated with very low child food security and child food insecurity. I examine the use of 
these products on very low food security and food insecurity, controlling for observable 
characteristics, in Table 15.  
 
In Column 1 of Table 15, I measure the association between use of any AFS product providing 
credit and very low food security of children. Ever using any of these AFS products is associated 
with a significant increase in the probability of very low food security among children of 1.4 
percentage points. In Columns 2 through 5, I estimate the relationship for each of these products 
individually. Respondents that report ever using any these services are associated with positive, 
significant, and sizeable increases in the probability of very low food security among children: 
pawn shops by 3.4 percentage points (Column 2), payday loans by 1.8 percentage points 
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(Column 3), rent-to-own agreements by 1.8 percentage points (Column 4) and RALs by 1.8 
percentage points (Column 5).  
 
In the remaining columns, I repeat the analysis for the child food insecurity outcome. Estimates 
suggest even larger and more significant relationships. Using any AFS product providing credit 
is associated with a significant increased risk of child food insecurity of 6.7 percentage points. 
Using a pawn shop is related to an increase in the risk of food insecurity of 13.4 percentage 
points, payday loans are related by 11.9 percentage points, rent-to-own outlets by 6.6 percentage 
points and RALs by 10.3 percentage points. Although not causal, these large estimates may 
suggest that households with children need greater access to credit, whether because of an 
economic shock, volatile income, or lack of mainstream credit alternatives. However, other 
explanations include households making poor decisions due to lack of financial education or 
self-control problems.  
 
The January 2009 CPS asked about the frequency of use for some of these credit products. More 
frequent reliance on these products could signal that households regularly struggle to meet their 
food needs. For pawn loans and rent-to-own agreements, respondents were asked to indicate if 
they utilized these services at least a few times a year, once or twice a year, or almost never.6
 
 In 
Table 16, I examine how the frequency of use for pawn loans (Columns 1 through 3) and rent-to-
own agreements (Columns 4 through 6) relate to child food security outcomes. Overall, 
households that ever used a pawn shop or rent-to-own agreement do so less frequently than users 
of AFS products providing financial transactions. For both pawn loans and rent-to-own 
agreements, using these services at least a few times a year is relatively rare with just 14 percent 
using either of these products with that frequency. More than half (60.2 percent) of those using a 
pawn shop loan report almost never using this service and almost half (47.6 percent) of rent-to-
own agreement users report this frequency.  
Although frequent use of these products is relatively rare, a positive relationship exists between 
frequent use of these products and very low food security of children. In 14.4 percent of 
households that use pawn shops at least a few times a year (Column 1), children are very low 
food secure and another 36.2 percent are classified as low food security. Similarly, 9.2 percent of 
                                                          
6 The January 2009 CPS did not ask about the frequency of use for RALs. 
42 
 
households that use rent-to-own agreements at least a few times per year (Column 4) have 
children that experience very low food security and 17.4 percent have children classified as low 
food security. These extremely high rates suggest that an unmet need for credit, poor financial 
management skills, or self-control problems among parents may play an important role in food 
insecurity among children. 
 
The most frequent users of pawn shops and rent-to-own agreements are also most likely to 
participate in SNAP, most likely to have received emergency food. More than half (53.9 percent) 
of the most frequent users of pawn shops, 44.5 percent of less frequent users, and 26.3 percent of 
rare users participate in SNAP. But, rates of participation in other food assistance programs from 
WIC and free or reduced price School Meals are relatively similar between households that use 
pawn shops at least a few times a year and once or twice a year. Similarly, the more than half 
(56.1 percent) of the most frequent users of rent-to-own agreements utilize SNAP but only 39.9 
percent of less frequent and 37.4 percent of rare users participate. 
 
I examine if the large associations between frequency of pawn shop or rent-to-own contract use 
and child food security remains after controlling for other observable characteristics of the 
household in Table 17. Households that rarely use these services but still are shown to face food 
security problems suggest that these results may be related to infrequent economic shocks to 
these households. Therefore, I treat households that almost never use these services identically as 
households that report they never used these services. In Column 1, using a pawn shop at least a 
few times a year is related to a significant increased probability of very low food security of 5.6 
percentage points while in Column 2, using a rent-to-own agreement at least a few times a year is 
not significantly related to very low food security. Thus, for both products, there is not that large 
of a change in the point estimate, although the rent-to-own coefficient is not longer statistically 
significant. This suggest that the more regular customers are facing food security problems. 
 
Next, I investigate the frequency in greater detail because of the large magnitude of the effects. I 
divide users of into separate groups based on the reported frequency of use. Compared to those 
who never borrow, a positive relationship for pawn shop use and very low food security exists 
for each frequency of pawn borrowing, although borrowing once or twice a year is not 
statistically significant (Column 3). Households that most regularly rely on pawn loans are 
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associated with an increased risk of very low child food security of 12.0 percentage points and 
this estimate is significantly different from other frequencies. The magnitude of this effect is 
striking and suggests regular pawn borrowers are facing extreme needs. Compared to those that 
never borrow, those borrowing from a pawn shop once or twice a year is positive but not 
statistically significant. This lack of significance may be due to sample size or lack of variation 
as the point estimates between those that almost never borrow and those that borrow once or 
twice a year are not significant different.  
 
In Column 4, I estimate the relationship between frequency of use for rent-to-own agreements 
and very low food security.  Comparing rent-to-own users to non-users, only the use of a rent-to-
own outlet at least a few times a year significantly increases the probability of very low food 
security of children. The estimate is 6.3 percentage points. Households that report almost never 
using a rent-to-own store or using a rent-to-own store only once or twice are not significantly 
related to the increases in very low food security of children. None of the point estimates that 
denote the frequencies of rent-to-own use are different. It may be that rent-to-own agreements 
are used by those who want higher levels of consumption on items that may not necessarily be 
necessities. In contrast, pawn shop customers may be in great need of for cash to purchase 
necessities. Thus, using a pawn shop at any time is highly associated with child food insecurity.  
 
Expanding the outcomes to child food insecurity in Columns 5 through 8, finds even larger and 
more significant relationships for these products. For pawn shops, any regular use of a pawn 
shop for credit is associated with an increased probability of child food insecurity of 17.0 
percentage points while any regular use of a rent-to-own agreement is associated with a 
significant 9.7 percentage point increase in child food insecurity. These estimates are confirmed 
in Columns 7 and 8 when the frequency of pawn loan use is detailed. For the most frequent pawn 
borrowers, the associated risk of child food insecurity rises to 28.8 points, compared to those that 
never borrow. For rent-to-own customers, rarely using the product is associated with a large and 
significant increase in the probability of food insecurity among children of 10.0 percentage 
points. While this is an odd result, the point estimate for rare users is not statistically different 
from those who use with other frequency. 
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In short, it appears that any level of borrowing from a pawn shop that is associated with an 
increased risk of very low food security and food insecurity. Perhaps one reason is that not only 
is the pawn loan for a relatively small amount, but the household must give up possession, at 
least temporarily, of the good used as collateral. In contrast, there does seem to be an increase in 
the risk of very low food security among children the more frequently a household utilizes this 
service, but the results aren’t consistent across specifications. One explanation is that, perhaps, 
even if over the long-term the rent-to-own item ends up costing many times what it would to 
purchase it at a store, the payments are broken down to more manageable amounts that could fit 
into an LMI household’s budget. 
Why do Households Use a Pawn Loan Rather than a Bank? 
With the large correlations found between pawn borrowing and child food security, I examine 
the main reason that households provide for borrowing from a pawn shop rather than a bank.7
 
 In 
Table 18, after grouping these responses into three reasons: economic, customer service, and 
other. Economic reasons include inability or difficulty in qualifying for a bank loan while 
customer service reasons include the lack of small loans offered by banks, discomfort with 
banks, or convenience of pawn shops.  
The main reason households use pawn loans rather than bank loans are nearly evenly split 
between economic reasons (45.4 percent) and customer service reasons (39.1 percent). However, 
households that utilize pawn shops for economic reasons are significantly more likely to have 
very low food security among children than those citing customer service reasons (8.1 percent 
versus 1.9 percent), and much more likely to have low food secure children (30.9 percent versus 
22.0 percent). Households citing economic reasons also have relatively high participation rates in 
SNAP but the differences in participation rates across reasons for pawn borrowing are smaller 
than the child food security rates would suggest. For example, 42.0 percent of those utilizing 
pawn shops for economic reasons participate in SNAP while 37.7 percent of those using these 
providers for customer service reasons participate in SNAP. 
 
Intensity of Payday Loan Borrowing 
The final AFS product providing credit services that I can explore in greater detail is payday 
loans. Unlike questions regarding the frequency of other AFS products, for payday loan users, 
                                                          
7 This question was not asked for rent-to-own agreements. 
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the CPS asked the household how many times over the past 12 months they used a payday loan.8
 
 
This detail allows the timing of the payday loan to be tied more closely to the timing of the food 
security measure. Additionally, as a continuous measure, it improves the understanding of how 
frequency of use affects child food security. 
In Table 19, I group the range of responses – zero through twenty – using the distribution in the 
data. Only 10.0 percent of households report ever using a payday loan but not in last 12 months 
(Column 1) and more than one-third (34.6 percent) report using a payday loan exactly once in 
the past 12 months  (Column 2). Slightly less than forty percent of payday loan users used a loan 
twice in the past 12 months (18.0 percent) or three to five times in the past 12 months (18.9 
percent). The remaining households use payday loans very frequently, ranging from six to ten 
times in the past 12 months (10.0 percent), eleven to fifteen times in the past 12 months (4.4 
percent) and sixteen to 20 times in the past 12 months (4.1 percent).  
 
In general, the more frequently households utilized payday lenders over the past 12 months, the 
greater the prevalence of very low food security among children and the greater the food 
insecurity of these children. Households that report ever using a payday loan but not in the last 
12 months (Column 1) exhibit the lowest rates of child food insecurity at 7.7 percent. None of 
these households contain children with very low food security. Within households that also used 
a payday loan infrequently, either once or twice over the past 12 months, roughly two percent 
contain children with very low food security. Households that use these loans the most 
frequently, sixteen or more times over the past 12 months, 8.3 percent contain children with very 
low food security (Column 7). 
 
In contrast to the differences seen in very low child food security by frequency of use of payday 
loans in the past 12 months, participation in SNAP is relatively stable across these different 
households with approximately one quarter of households reporting receipt. There does, 
however, seem to be a relationship between food assistance programs targeted more explicitly 
towards children: School Meals and WIC. Households that ever reported using a payday loan but 
report using one five times or less in the past 12 months participate in WIC at a rate of 11 to 18 
percent. But, households that report using a payday loan six or more times in the past 12 months 
                                                          
8 Respondents were given direction to count a rollover loan as a new loan. 
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participate in WIC at a rate of 24 to 31 percent. Additionally, more than half of households at the 
upper tail of frequency of use of payday loans – eleven times or more in the past 12 month –
receive free or reduced price School Lunch and nearly half receiving free or reduced price 
School Breakfast. 
 
I examine the intensity of payday loan borrowing over the past 12 months affects child food 
security in a regression framework in Table 20. In Column 1, I estimate the association between 
the total number of payday loans during the past 12 months on very low food security of 
children. Each additional loan used is significantly related to an increased risk of very low food 
security among children of 0.4 percentage points. This estimate is large in magnitude as the 
overall very low food security rate is only 1.3 percent. 
 
Because relationships may not be linear, I break the number of payday loans the household 
borrows over the past 12 months into a set of dichotomous variables: only one payday loan, only 
two payday loans, three to five payday loans, six to ten payday loans, eleven to fifteen payday 
loans, and sixteen through twenty payday loans. Compared to households that did not borrow 
from a payday lender during the last 12 months, using three to five payday loans over the past 12 
months is associated with the greatest increase in risk of very low food security with a 5.0 
percentage point increase (Column 2). Except for using one payday loan in the past 12 months, 
each level of frequency suggests a positive increase in the risk of very low food security, 
although the coefficients are not statistically significant. 
 
I repeat the analysis for the food insecurity outcome and find larger effects. In Column 3, each 
additional payday loan increases the probability of food insecurity by 1.7 percentage points. 
Compared to those that did not borrow in the last 12 months, more payday loans, in general, is 
associated with an increased risk of food insecurity (Column 4). Households with one payday 
loan in the past 12 months significantly increase the probability of food insecure children by 7.8 
percentage points, those with two by 14.1 percentage points, those with three to five payday 
loans by 18.8 percentage points, those with six to ten by 12.3 percentage points, and those with 
11 to 15 by 24.6 points. For those with 16 to 20 payday loans, the point estimate suggests a 22.6 
percentage point increase but just misses conventional significance levels (p=0.12). Each of these 
suggests a large and important relationship of payday loan use on child food insecurity. 
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Why do Households Use Payday Loans Rather than a Bank? 
For those that reported ever using a payday loan, the CPS asked the main reason the household 
used this service rather than a bank. In Table 21, I examine the main reason for using payday 
lenders, grouping these into economic, customer service, and other reasons. For payday loans, 
economic reasons relate to difficulty or inability to qualify for a bank loan. Nearly two thirds 
(66.2 percent) of those ever using a payday loan rather than a bank do so for economic reasons. 
Most of the remaining users of payday loans (24.1 percent) use these products for customer 
service reasons, such as convenience and comfort.  
 
Households using payday loans for economic reasons and for customer service reasons have 
nearly identical rates of very low food security among children at roughly four percent, but those 
citing economic reasons have far higher rates of low child food security than household citing 
customer service reasons (26.8 percent compared to 12.6 percent). No households citing other 
reasons for using a payday loan contain children with very low food security but 22.7 percent of 
these households contain low food secure children.  
 
Despite differences in child food insecurity rates across households depending on why they used 
these services, all of these households report similar participation rates in SNAP and other food 
assistance programs. Compared to the 23.8 percent of households that use payday loans for 
customer service reasons, 27.6 percent of households that use a payday loan for economic 
reasons receive SNAP. 
 
Do Households Use AFS Credit for Necessities Like Food? 
To determine if the large correlations found between use of credit provided by AFS providers 
and child food insecurity are plausible, I examine the intended purpose of this borrowing. If 
households borrow for frivolous expenses, then the relationships found may not be the cause of 
child food security status but an indicator of some other factor. However, if the purpose of 
borrowing was to purchase necessities, it suggests that use of AFS credit can be tied directly 
related to child food security because households do use these products to purchase necessities 
like food. 
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The January 2009 CPS asked households that ever used a payday loan, pawn loan, rent-to-own 
agreement, or RAL the main purpose this credit was needed over the last 12 months. Table 22 
presents this information. Households report using these products to make up for lost income 
(15.5 percent) or for purposes that could be characterized as necessities, such as basic living 
expenses (39.2 percent), house repairs or to purchase an appliance (8.7 percent), medical 
expenses (2.2 percent), car repairs (3.5 percent), and school or childcare expenses (1.3 percent). 
Only 6.5 percent reported a special gift or luxury purchase as the main reason for utilizing these 
services. Although almost one quarter (23.1 percent) of the sample volunteered another reason, 
even if all these households purchased something other than a necessity, more households would 
report using these products to pay for necessities and day-to-day expenses. Thus, these AFS 
products are generally not used for frivolous purchases and using an AFS product to ensure an 
adequate amount of food is a plausible use of these products.  
 
I also examine how each of these purposes relates to child food security in Table 22. Households 
that report purposes that are most related to day-to-day expenses or emergencies have the highest 
rates of very low food security among children. These range from approximately 4 percent for 
lost income (Column 1), basic living expenses (Column 2), and car repairs (Column 5) to 
approximately 10 percent for medical (Column 4) and school or childcare expenses (Column 6). 
Notably, no households that report using these products for special gifts or luxuries (Column 7) 
had children with very low food security. Rates of low food security follow similar patterns with 
the greatest prevalence among households that utilized these products for necessities and the 
lowest prevalence among households that utilized these products for special gifts or luxuries. 
 
Finally, I also examine use of food assistance programs by the main purpose that households 
used AFS credit. Approximately one-third of households that used any of these AFS credit 
products over the past 12 months due to lost income (31.9 percent), basic living expenses (37.5 
percent), house repairs (35.0 percent) or medical expenses (36.3 percent) participate in SNAP. 
Households that reported any other reasons for using AFS credit are less likely to receive SNAP, 
with participation rates ranging from 15.5 percent for car repairs to 25.0 percent for special gifts 
or luxuries. Participation rates in other food assistance programs reflect a similar pattern of 
participation by reported purpose of AFS credit. 
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Is There a Causal Relationship between AFS Products and Child Food Security? 
The relationships identified thus far have focused on correlations and have been unable to answer 
the question if use of AFS products causes very low food security among children or if 
households with very low food security among children are also more likely to use these 
products. The next set of estimates attempt to identify any causal relationships between the use 
of AFS products and very low food security among children and child food insecurity by using 
state laws to generate plausibly exogenous variation. Because a plausible and strong instrument 
could not be identified, I am unable to present any sort of causal analysis for non-bank check 
cashers, non-bank money orders, rent-to-own outlets, or RALs. But, for non-bank check cashers 
and rent-to-own outlets, I can present evidence about how state laws and regulations can affect 
the relationship between AFS product use and child food security. 
 
Non-Bank Check Cashers 
I begin with the use of non-bank check cashers. State laws that limit the fees non-bank check 
cashing services can charge could potentially serve as an instrument, but estimates are not 
statistically significant enough to avoid the weak instrument problem. Instead, I determine if 
there is a different effect of using a non-bank check casher in states with and without these laws 
by interacting these laws with use of a non-bank check casher in Table 23. Recall from earlier 
that the expected effect of regulating check cashers is to reduce the supply of these providers 
because households are relatively price inelastic.  
 
Estimates for the effect of non-bank check cashers in both types of states are statistically 
insignificant. For states with regulation, the estimates are practically zero for very low food 
security while in those that do not, the point estimates suggest a reduction in very low food 
security of 1.2 percentage points. For food insecurity (Column 2), estimates are larger in 
magnitude and significant for states that regulate check casher fees. Households using a check 
casher in states that regulate check cashing services are associated with significant increases in 
child food insecurity of 7.2 percentage points, significant at the one percent level. Meanwhile, 
households that utilize check cashing services in unregulated states are associated with declines 
in food insecurity, although the estimate is not statistically significant. For households needing 
immediate access to the funds from their check, the fewer the number of non-bank check 
cashers, the greater the limit on their ability to maintain enough money for food. 
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Pawn Shops  
To examine causal effects of pawn use, I utilize two potential instruments: state laws requiring 
pawn shops to return excess proceeds from the sale of the pawned item and state laws limiting 
interest and other fees for pawn loans. To capture state laws limiting interest and other fees, I 
create a dichomotous variable based on calculations by Avery and Samolyck (2011) that interest 
and other fees on a hypothetical two-month, $80 pawn loan are less than $10. Pawn consumers 
are relatively inelastic and both instruments reduce the supply of pawn shops (Shackman and 
Tenney 2006; Avery and Samolyck 2011).  Shackman and Tenney (2006) find that state interest 
rate ceilings and rules requiring pawnshops to return excess proceeds from the sale of collateral 
items reduce the supply of pawnshops, measured on a per capita basis. 
 
In Table 24, I estimate 2SLS models. I include the first stage results (Panel A), the reduced form 
results (Panel B), and the IV results (Panel C). In Panel A, both policies significantly reduce 
reported use of pawn shops. State policies that limit the charges on an $80 loan to $10 or less 
reduces use of pawn loans by 3.5 percentage points (Column 1) while rules that require pawn 
shops to return excess proceeds from the sale of a good reduces use of pawn loans by 4.6 
percentage points (Column 2). With both policies in the first stage regression (Column 3), 
coefficients remain significant but fall slightly in magnitude. In all three regressions, the F-
statistic is 15.14 or greater, suggesting that the 2SLS specification will not face large bias due to 
the weak instrument problem.  
 
In Panel B, I present reduced form estimates to provide initial evidence for the 2SLS estimates. 
State laws resulting in low costs for pawn loans are associated with small (0.2 percentage points) 
but significant declines in very low food security among children while excess proceeds rules are 
also associated with small (0.2 percentage points) but insignificant declines in very low food 
security. Include both policies together results in a similar but now insignificant effect for pawn 
loans but no statistically or economically important effect on excess proceeds rules. Reduced 
form estimates for food insecurity find larger and more significant effects when these policies are 
explored separately: a significant decline of 1.4 percentage points for policies reducing costs and 
a significant decline of 1.3 percentage points for policies related to excess proceeds. When both 
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are included in the regression, however, point estimates remain negative but are no longer 
insignificant. 
 
The final panel of Table 24 presents the 2SLS estimates. When policies limiting the cost of a 
loan are used, pawn shops have a large casual effect on very low food security among children, 
increasing very low food security among children by 9.4 percentage points and food insecurity 
among children by 38.1 percentage points. When excess proceeds policies are used as an 
instrument, pawn shops again have large causal effects on food insecurity but results are less 
significant: a positive but insignificant increased in very low food security of 5.1 percentage 
points and a positive and statistically significant effect on food insecurity of 26.9 percentage 
points. Finally, using both policies, pawn shops have a positive but not statistically significant 
effect on very low food security of 6.6 percentage points but a positive and significant effect for 
food insecurity of 30.7 percentage points. 
 
While estimates across all specifications are not statistically significant for very low food 
security across all specifications, the point estimates are all positive, ranging from 5.1 to 9.4 
percentage points for very low food security and 26.9 to 38.1 percentage points for child food 
insecurity. This suggests that borrowing from a pawn shop causes child food insecurity. One 
explanation for this is that that the parent is forced to give up a durable good of value to the 
household in exchange for roughly half of the item’s resale value. Particularly for the unbanked, 
the assets of LMI households may hold their assets in non-liquid form. Surrendering the good for 
roughly half its face value may provide the household very little liquidity with which to purchase 
food and reduce the household’s assets.  
 
Rent-to-Own Agreements  
States differ in the laws affecting rent-to-own requirements. I utilize state polices that require a 
lessor to disclose a standard set of information about the rent-to-own agreement related to the 
full purchase price on the product label (McKernan et al. 2003). This additional information 
should reduce the uncertainty about the price the customer will pay, particularly for those with 
low levels of financial education and knowledge. 
 
I run regressions separately by state disclosure requirements to determine if there is a different 
relationship between rent-to-own use and child food security, depending on how much 
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information the customer is given about the full purchase price. Estimates are presented in Table 
25, with Columns 1 and 2 presenting the effects on very low food security and Columns 3 and 4 
presenting the results for food insecurity. 
 
Beginning with very low food security among children, estimates in both states with and without 
disclosure requirements are relatively similar with approximately a 1.7 percentage point increase 
in the risk of very low food security. While the estimate in states with disclosure requirements is 
statistically significant and those without disclosure requirements are not statistically significant, 
the smaller sample size for states without disclosure requirements could explain this lack of 
precision. 
 
Expanding the outcome to child food insecurity, I find positive and significant estimates in states 
with and without disclosure requirements. A rent-to-own agreement in a state without a 
disclosure requirement is associated with a 25.8 percentage point increase in child food 
insecurity while in a state with a disclosure requirement, the relationship is only 5.9 percentage 
points. The smaller point estimate in states with disclosure requirements could be that these 
disclosure requirements help to solve the customer’s information and self-control problems 
(Zikmund-Fisher and Parker, 1999). In other words, once the customer knows the true full price 
of the item, some whose lease would reduce their ability to acquire enough resources for food 
may reconsider entering into the agreement and are able to use those funds for necessities.  
 
Payday Loans  
Finally, I estimate 2SLS models for the effect of payday loans on very low food security of 
children. For instruments, I utilize state laws and regulations that ban payday loans either 
implicitly or explicitly. As of 2008, 37 states had such a law or regulation that limits consumer 
access to payday loans, although somewhat imperfectly given that some consumers can drive 
across state lines to access these loans or borrow on the internet. Because I seek to measure 
payday loan use over the same period as food security is measured, I only treat those households 
that report using one or more payday loans over the last year.9
 
 
                                                          
9 In practice, this matters little for the empirical estimates. Estimates are nearly the same if payday loan use is 
measured as households reporting they ever used a loan or measured as reporting they used a payday loan over the 
last 12 months.  
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The 2SLS results are shown in Table 26. In Panel A, households living in states with a payday 
loan ban significantly reduces the probability a household used a payday loan in the last year by 
4.2 percentage points. In Panel B, neither relationship is statistically significant. The point 
estimate for payday lending bans on very low food security is basically zero and the point 
estimate for payday lending bans on food insecurity is small. There is no economic or statistical 
relationship with state payday lending bans and very low food security of children. The point 
estimate for the effect of payday loan bans on child food insecurity is negative, but small and 
statistically insignificant. 
 
Given the reduced form results, it is not surprising that the 2SLS estimates are insignificant in 
Panel C. The point estimates on very low food security and food insecurity, however, are 
opposite in sign. This implies, if there were greater precision, payday loans could have a 
different effect on those at different margins of food insecurity. For example, for those that 
infrequently use a payday loan, it could immediately reduce child food insecurity by providing 
liquidity to purchase necessities. With frequent use or measured over a longer term, it could 
increase child food insecurity due to debt. 
 
The lack of clear causal results on payday loan use is consistent with the literature. Payday loans 
in particular could have ambiguous effects on economic well-being: they could improve well-
being by providing short-term liquidity to manage an economic shock but could diminish well-
being by creating unmanageable debt. Work examining high-cost, short-term loans, in general, 
reaches mixed conclusions. Karlan and Zinman (2010) find increases in food consumption after 
receiving a high-cost loan but Melzer (2011) finds no significant relationship between high-cost 
loans and food hardship. For payday loans, specifically, empirical findings are generally mixed 
on the effects of payday loans on these outcomes (Campbell et al., 2008; Karlan and Zinman, 
2010; Melzer, 2011; Melzer and Morgan, 2009; Morgan and Strain, 2008; Morse, 2009; Skiba 
and Tobacman, 2007; Zinman 2010). But, the only study to specifically examine the effect of 
payday lending and food security by Fitzpatrick and Coleman-Jensen (2013) finds that among all 
households, payday loan use improves well-being by reducing the likelihood a household will be 
classified as not food secure. The more narrowed sample and more extreme outcomes examined 
in this project could explain the different results. 
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Organization of Household Finances 
Sharing of Finances 
The final set of decisions I consider are decisions related to household financial organization for 
households with two adults. First, I examine the decision to share finances for those with more 
than one adult with basic descriptive statistics in Table 27. For households with more than one 
adult, respondents could indicate if the adults have shared finances, the adults in the household 
have some shared and some separate finances, or the adults have separate finances even though 
they share a living space. Respondents could also volunteer that they were the only adult in the 
household. More than two-thirds of respondents (68.0 percent) indicated that the adults share 
their finances and less than 10 percent (9.7 percent) indicated that they separate their finances. 
Almost one-fifth (17.9 percent) falls between these two extremes, with respondents indicating 
that they share only some of their finances. Few households (4.4 percent) indicate that they are 
the only adult in the household. 
 
As the conceptual model suggested, sharing of finances is associated with child food security. 
Households that share finances have low rates of very low food security among children (0.8 
percent) and low rates of food insecurity (7.1 percent). But, there does not seem to be a 
relationship between the extent of financial sharing and child food security. Households that 
share all finances appear very similar to households that maintain some shared and some separate 
finances.  
 
In contrast, households where adults have separate finances (Column 4) have much higher rates 
of very low food security and low food security than households that have at least some sharing 
of finances. In households where respondents indicate they maintain separate finances, despite 
sharing living space, children experience low food security at a rate of 11.2 percent and very low 
food security at a rate of 3.3 percent. These rates are roughly double the rates of households that 
maintain at least some shared finances. 
 
Households with all shared finances and households with some shared and some separate 
finances look similar in their use of food assistance. The use of food assistance is greater among 
households where adults maintain separate finances than households that share some or all their 
finances, surprising fact given that eligibility for food assistance requires households to pool the 
resources of all adults in the household. Compared to households that share at least some of their 
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finances, SNAP participation over the past 12 months is more than two times greater (21.6 
percent compared to 8.5 percent), WIC participation over the past 30 days is roughly double 
(14.2 percent compared to 7.4 percent), receipt of free or reduced price School Lunch is more 
than twice as high (32.4 percent compared to 13.9 percent), receipt of free or reduced price 
School Breakfast is more than double (25.5 percent compared to 9.8 percent), and receipt of 
emergency food from a non-profit (8.0 percent compared to 4.0 percent). 
 
Table 28 presents the results for how resource sharing affects child food security outcomes. I 
measure resource sharing in two ways: a dichotomous variable indicating that adults in the 
household report all shared finances and a dichotomous variable indicating that adults in the 
household share at least some finances.  In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 28, the very low food 
security among children outcome is considered. When adults share all finances, it is associated 
with a significant reduction in very low food security among children of nearly one percentage 
point (Column 1). In Column 2 the financial sharing is measured as households that share at least 
some of their finances and the relationship is slightly larger with an associated decreased of 
slightly more than one percentage point. With rates of child food security in the overall sample at 
1.3 percent, this is a large reduction in this probability. Thus, it appears that the extent of 
financial resource sharing is not as important as long as there is some resource sharing – 
maintaining separate finances is associated with higher rates very low food security among 
children. 
 
In Columns 3 and 4, food insecurity among children is estimated. None of these outcomes are 
statistically significant or large in magnitude. All point estimates are negative and larger negative 
estimates are found for sharing at least some finances, compared to sharing all finances. Thus, 
there does seem to be an association between the sharing of at least some financial resources and 
improvements in food security status of children even if it is imprecisely measured. 
 
Next, I investigate if the gender of the respondent matters in Table 29. I examine how the 
observed differences in child food insecurity and use of food assistance by households that make 
different decisions related to financial organization are affected by the gender of the respondent. 
I limit the sample of households with more than one adult to the 78 percent of households that 
had the same respondent in both the December 2008 CPS and January 2009 CPS to keep the 
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respondent’s gender constant and eliminate any bias generated from changing respondents. Of all 
households with more than one adult, 26.8 percent had the same male respondent in both months 
while 51.3 percent were the same female respondent in both months. The remaining households 
with more than one adult changed respondents between the December 2008 CPS and the January 
2009 CPS.  
 
In Table 29, I examine how males and females that report different levels of household financial 
resource sharing look on food insecurity of children, and use of food assistance. In these simple 
cross-tabulations, there does not appear to be a protective effect of gender on food security 
among children. Within each level of resource sharing, rates of low food security and very low 
food security among children are slightly higher for female respondents, compared to male 
respondents. For example, when females report shared finances, rates of food insecurity among 
children are 9.2 percent whereas when males report shared finances the rates are 5.5 percent. One 
possible explanation can be found from an examination of food security data in Canada. 
Matheson and McIntyre (2013) conclude that females report higher levels of food insecurity than 
males even when living in the same house.10
 
 
Gender does seem to play a role in reporting the receipt of food assistance with female 
respondents significantly more likely to report receiving food assistance. This may result from 
less measurement error as women in the household possessing more knowledge about food 
shopping and food spending than the male in the household. Females that share their finances 
report SNAP participation rates of 10.1 percent versus males report 6.8 percent. The same trend 
appears for all different types of financial resource sharing (some sharing and separate) but the 
results are even more dramatic: 23.8 percent of females with separate finances report receiving 
SNAP but only 9.7 percent of males with separate finances report receiving SNAP. These same 
trends also appear for other types of food assistance – free or reduced price meals, free or 
reduced price breakfast, and WIC.  
 
I next turn to the extent it matters if men or women the sharing of finances. As described earlier, 
the literature that examines how expenditures on children relates to income pooling suggests that 
                                                          
10 Canada uses the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Household Food Security Survey Module so food insecurity 
measures are directly comparable between the U.S. and Canada.  
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when women have control over finances, they are better able to spend money on children. I 
explore this in Table 30. I keep only those households where the same respondent in both months 
of the CPS and estimate separate models for male respondents and female respondents separately 
and examine the decision to pool at least some finances.  
 
The first two columns of Table 30 show the results for complete sharing of financial resources on 
very low food security of children. For very low food security among children (Columns1 and 
2), at least some sharing of finances continues to suggest a protective effect on children. Female 
respondents are associated with larger reductions in very low food security than male 
respondents, although neither estimate is statistically significant. In Columns 3 and 4, I examine 
child food insecurity. Comparing females and males based on at least some sharing of financial 
resources, the effect for females is a large, negative, and significant relationship of 4.9 
percentage points between sharing at least some finances and food insecurity among children 
while males is a positive, but insignificant. This is similar to Kenney (2008), who concludes that 
in two parent households that pool their financial resources, greater control of financial resources 
by the mother is associated with decreases in child food insecurity. 
 
Overall, it appears that it is not important that the adults share all financial resources, so long as 
they share at least some financial resources. In other words, the pooling of some resources is 
important because it allows the household to achieve some level of economies of scale. These 
economies may better meet the expenditure needs of these households. It also appears that when 
females have at least some control over financial resources, they may be able to direct those 
resources to food for their children.  
 
Joint Participation in Financial Decisions 
In Table 31, I also how much respondents in two adult households participate in the financial 
decisions of the household: a lot, some, or not at all. The vast majority of respondents (83.4 
percent) report a lot of participation in financial decisions of households. The remaining 
respondents report some participation (16.0 percent). Very few (1.7 percent) report that they do 
not participate in the financial decisions of the household.  
 
Respondents that report only some participation in the financial decisions of the household 
exhibit higher rates of low food security compared to respondents in households that report a lot 
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of participation (10.4 percent versus 6.1 percent, respectively). Additionally, very low food 
security among children is slightly greater (1.6 percent in households with some participation 
compared to 0.7 percent in households with a lot of participation). Households that report no 
participation have child food insecurity rates similar to those that report some participation. 
These patterns also occur for household food security outcomes.  
 
Examining the use of food assistance programs, respondents in households with less 
participation in financial decisions show greater use of food assistance than respondents in 
households with a lot of participation. The largest use of food assistance program is among the 
few households that report they do not participate at all in the financial decisions of the 
household. 
 
Table 32 presents the regression results for child food security outcomes on the amount of 
participation in financial decisions in households with more than one adult. The extent of 
participation in household finances the respondent reports is measured in two ways: as a 
dichotomous variable indicating the respondent reports having “a lot” of participation in the 
financial decisions of the household and a dichotomous variable indicating the respondent 
reports having “some” or “a lot” of participation in the financial decisions of the household.  
 
In Columns 1 and 2, I examine very low food security based on complete sharing of finances 
(Column 1) and at least some sharing of finances (Column 2). The point estimates for both 
measures of financial participation are negative and insignificant, although the point estimate for 
some or a lot of participation in the financial decisions of the household is larger with an 
associated reduction of two percentage points. 
 
In Columns 3 and 4, I investigate the relationship between financial participation in the 
household and food insecurity of children. Respondents that report a lot of financial participation 
in the household are associated with a 2.6 percentage point decline in food insecurity among 
children. Respondents that report some or a lot of participation are associated with a smaller 
reduction in food insecurity among children at 1.4 percentage points, although the estimate is not 
significant. 
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Table 33 presents the same gender analysis for the amount of participation in the financial 
decisions of the household. There again does not seem to be a protective effect of gender on 
child food security. If anything, the rates of food insecurity among children tend to be slightly 
greater for females rather than males with the same level of financial participation in the 
household. For example, among females that report a lot of participation in the financial 
decisions of the household, rates of low child food security and very low food security among 
children are 7.3 percent and 0.8 percent, respectively. In contrast, for males that report a lot of 
participation, rates of low child food security and very low food security among children are 4.1 
percent and 0.6 percent, respectively. The only level of participation where female report lower 
levels of child food insecurity than males are households that report they have no financial 
participation. However, extremely small sample sizes limit inference. 
 
Females report slightly higher rates of the food assistance programs for any level of participation 
in household decisions, although the difference is greatest for those respondents that report a lot 
of participation in the financial decisions of the household. For example, females with a lot of 
participation in financial decisions of the household report SNAP receipt at 9.9 percent while 
males report SNAP receipt at 5.3 percent.  These differences in report rates could be explained in 
the same way as for the amount of sharing of finances: either recall error or stigma. 
 
In Table 34, I examine differences across gender for households with the same respondent in 
both months of the CPS. As before, I run separate regressions for households with male 
respondents and households with female respondents. I examine only the choice to participate “a 
lot” in the financial decisions of the household because, from earlier results, there is a 
relationship between “a lot” of participation and reductions in food insecurity. In Columns 1 and 
2, I compare male and female respondents for the very low food security outcome. When males 
and females report “a lot” of participation in the financial decisions of the household, the point 
estimates are opposite in sign but only the male respondents achieve statistical significance. For 
males, “a lot” of participation in the financial decisions of the household is associated with a 
nearly one percentage point increase in very low food security. For females, “a lot” of 
participation is associated with a statistically insignificant decline in very low food security 
among children.  
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Columns 3 and 4 of Table 34 examine food insecurity. The relationship between “a lot” of 
participation and food insecurity is nearly identical for males and females – both point estimates 
are statistically significant and reveal a decline of 4 percentage points on food insecurity among 
children. The remaining columns of Table 34 present the results for children with marginal, low, 
or very low food security of children. For both males and females, “a lot” of financial 
participation is associated with statistically insignificant declines. Although insignificant, the 
estimated relationship for males is more than twice as large as that for females. 
 
Based on the literature concerning the effect of female involvement in financial decisions 
affecting outcomes for children, the small magnitudes of these relationships and the lack of 
statistical significance are surprising. Explanations could be the relatively small sample sizes, 
limited number of possible answers, or progress made in gender equality. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The findings presented in this project provide insight into the potential impact that a parent’s use 
of financial services and choices about financial organization may have on the food security 
status of children in the household. One key contribution of this project is to provide evidence on 
this relatively unexplored area of food insecurity. While the existing food safety net, particularly 
SNAP, reduces food insecurity among children, this research suggests that addressing childhood 
hunger requires a multifaceted approach that addresses the transactional, credit, and financial 
organizational needs of households.  
 
Policymakers can use these results in several ways. First, policymakers should build on the 
success of the SNAP program to address the needs of children at-risk for food insecurity. 
Outreach related to SNAP and other food assistance programs should be better targeted based on 
bank account ownership and AFS use of the local population to ensure that parents are aware of 
food assistance resources available to them, including emergency food programs that could reach 
at-risk children. Federally-funded outreach, state outreach, and grants to local communities could 
target areas where many AFS providers, particularly pawn shops, are located because the 
analysis revealed that parents that use AFS products are more likely to have children that 
experience very low food security and food insecurity.  
 
One of the major contributions of this project was to examine the unbanked population in detail.  
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I find that the unbanked have high rates of both SNAP receipt and very low food security but the 
formerly banked is at very high risk of experiencing food insecurity among children. This is 
especially true for households that the bank closed their account on their behalf. With the 
negative stigma associated with a bank closing the account and, therefore, likely misreporting of 
who closed the account, these relationships could be lower bound estimates. One way to better 
target these households for food assistance would be to explore utilizing database like 
ChexSystems, a system used by financial institutions to report individuals that experience 
overdrafts, insufficient-funds issues, or similar problems with bank account ownership. Using 
this database could provide information on where and when to intervene reach children at-risk 
for food insecurity. 
 
Furthermore, the USDA and/or non-profit providers of food assistance should consider 
participating in state and local BankOn Initiatives. BankOn Initiative creates public-private 
partnerships to pair unbanked households with banks and credit unions offering low-cost 
accounts appropriate for needs of LMI households. These accounts typically are low-cost basic 
accounts that do not have a checkbook facility, making it difficult to overwithdraw the account. 
In addition, BankOn also provides financial education to improve financial management skills. 
Greater access to appropriate accounts may reduce some reliance on AFS products and reduce 
credit costs for these households.  
 
Additionally, across all types of households at-risk for child food insecurity, there appears to be 
substantial opportunities to teach financial management skills. In a sense, this work confirms 
previous work that finds financial management skills may play a role in preventing food 
insecurity and very low food security (see Dollahite et al., 2003; Dowler, 1997; Kenney, 2011; 
Olson et al., 2004). Attempts should also be made to incorporate financial literacy and financial 
management skills among households receiving food assistance so that these households can 
make better decisions regarding the type of financial services to use. Improving these skills could 
be accomplished with educational interventions through BankOn programs, the EFNEP, and/or 
educational programs in place for SNAP participants.  For example, because the SNAP EBT card 
in many ways functions similarly to a debit account, introducing households entering SNAP to 
basic financial skills may improve outcomes and assist households with basic financial 
management skills. 
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Additionally, throughout this project, I find an unmet need for credit exists. Ensuring that 
households with children at-risk for food insecurity have access to liquidity is important. One 
source of liquidity that may help households is bimonthly distribution of SNAP benefits, as has 
been suggested by others including Shapiro (2005). Another source would be to work with the 
new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to develop lower cost short-term credit for 
households that would otherwise utilize credit from payday lenders or pawn shops. 
 
While it is beyond the scope of this project to examine SNAP use in detail, it is important to note 
that high rates of SNAP receipt among the unbanked pose difficulties for program administration 
because even if the unbanked would have little in liquid assets, accurate asset verification is 
more difficult and costly when households do not maintain a bank account. Additionally, one 
potential concern is that some households exit the banking system in an attempt to hide assets to 
ensure eligibility before even applying for SNAP. This research suggests that closing a bank 
account may negatively affect food security. More research is needed to examine this possibility 
but SNAP administrators should clearly articulate the asset tests households will face and 
encourage these households to maintain a bank account throughout any period of SNAP receipt. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 All households face common financial decisions which could alter the risk of food insecurity for 
their children. Using data from the December 2008 and January 2009 CPS, this study explored 
the determinants of very low food security and food insecurity among children as they relate to 
the use of financial services and household financial organization. I find evidence that a large 
portion of households with children choose not to own a bank account and an even larger portion 
choose to use AFS products providing basic financial transactions and/or credit. These decisions 
can have important consequences on the food security status of children. 
 
I find strong evidence that forgoing a bank account or using an AFS product is correlated with 
food-related hardship. Evidence that these behaviors cause food insecurity among children 
depends on the product. In simple cross-tabulations, unbanked households are more likely to 
experience very low food insecurity among children and to rely on food assistance programs to 
meet food needs. Previously banked households appear the worst off. Households that ever used 
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AFS products also appear to face food-related distress, although not to the extent as the 
unbanked or previously banked. 
 
Low-income households potentially face great difficulties operating with the constraints of their 
budget. Poor financial management skills may make this task more difficult. Improving financial 
management skills, appropriate bank accounts, and short-term credit sources among this 
population with high rates of food insecurity is one potential role for public policy. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Sample of Households with Children, by Financial Decisions, Weighted 
 All Unbanked Banked No AFS Any AFS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Demographic Characteristics   
Age of Primary Earner 40.240 (10.219) 
36.282 
(11.637) 
40.656 
(9.969) 
41.134   
(9.758) 
38.939   
(10.724) 
Age of Oldest Child 10.196    (5.140) 
9.540 
(5.170) 
10.265 
(5.132) 
10.290   
(5.142) 
10.058   
(5.134) 
Coupled 0.690   (0.463) 
0.360 
(0.480) 
0.724 
(0.447) 
0.760    
(0.427) 
0.588    
(0.492) 
Single Parent  0.310   (0.463) 
0.640 
(0.480) 
0.276 
(0.447) 
0.240    
(0.427)     
0.412    
(0.492) 
White 0.788     (0.409) 
0.590 
(0.492) 
0.808   
(0.394) 
0.811   
(0.391) 
0.753    
(0.431) 
Black, Non-Hispanic 0.134   (0.341) 
0.332    
(0.471) 
0.114   
(0.317) 
0.106   
(0.302) 
0.182    
(0.386) 
Hispanic 0.175 (0.380) 
0.377 
(0.485) 
0.154 
(0.361) 
0.159  
(0.366) 
0.198    
(0.399) 
Native Born Citizen 0.823   (0.381) 
0.710    
(0.454) 
0.835 
(0.371) 
0.797   
(0.402) 
0.861    
(0.346) 
Economic Characteristics   
Less than High School 0.069   (0.253) 
0.306   
 (0.461) 
0.044 
(0.204) 
0.050    
(0.217) 
0.096 
(0.295) 
High School 0.219   (0.414) 
0.407    
(0.492) 
0.200   
(0.400) 
0.173   
(0.378) 
0.287   
(0.452) 
Some College 0.319    (0.466) 
0.251    
(0.434) 
0.326    
(0.469) 
0.288   
(0.453) 
0.364   
(0.481) 
Household Income Under 50% of 
Poverty 
0.061   
(0.239) 
0.303    
(0.460) 
0.035   
(0.184) 
0.037  
(0.190) 
0.094    
(0.292) 
Household Income 50% -100% of 
Poverty 
0.090   
(0.287) 
0.284   
 (0.451) 
0.070 
(0.255) 
0.061   
(0.239) 
0.133    
(0.340) 
Household Income 100% - 130% of 
Poverty  
0.083   
(0.276) 
0.161   
 (0.368) 
0.075   
(0.264) 
0.064   
(0.244) 
0.112   
(0.315) 
Household Income 130% - 185% of 
Poverty 
0.083   
(0.276) 
0.069   
 (0.254) 
0.084   
(0.278) 
0.065    
(0.246) 
0.109   
(0.312) 
Household Income Above 185% of 
Poverty  
0.589 
(0.492) 
0.095   
 (0.293) 
0.640   
(0.480) 
0.665  
(0.472) 
0.477   
(0.500) 
Missing Household Income 0.094   (0.292) 
0.088   
 (0.284) 
0.095   
(0.293) 
0.108   
(0.311) 
0.074  
(0.262) 
Member of Household in Armed 
Forces 
0.014 
(0.115) 
0.003    
(0.054) 
0.015 
(0.120) 
0.012   
(0.107) 
0.016   
 (0.127) 
Employed Full-Time 0.840    (0.366) 
0.495   
 (0.500) 
0.877   
(0.329) 
0.876   
(0.329) 
0.787   
(0.409) 
Employed Part-Time 0.057   (0.232) 
0.130   
 (0.337) 
0.049   
(0.216) 
0.048   
(0.214) 
0.070   
(0.255) 
Unemployed 0.038   (0.191) 
0.133   
 (0.340) 
0.028   
(0.165) 
0.022    
(0.147) 
0.061   
(0.239) 
Not Employed, Disabled 0.023   (0.150) 
0.083   
 (0.276) 
0.017    
(0.129) 
0.017   
(0.131) 
0.031   
(0.174) 
Not Employed, Retired, or Out of 
Labor Force 
0.042   
(0.200) 
0.158    
(0.365) 
0.029   
(0.169) 
0.035    
(0.185) 
0.051   
(0.219) 
Local Characteristics    
State Unemployment Rate 5.771 (1.098) 
5.772    
(1.009) 
5.770   
(1.107) 
5.806  
(1.106) 
5.719   
(1.084) 
Number of Banks per 1,000 Persons 
Over Age 16 
0.418 
(0.122) 
0.406   
 (0.117) 
0.416   
(0.122) 
0.414   
(0.121) 
0.418   
(0.122) 
Observations 9,253 742 8,511 5,589 3,664 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All 
sample statistics weighted by the Food Security Supplement (FSS) weight. Standard errors provided in parentheses. Households that used AFS 
products include those report ever using a payday loan, ever using a non-bank check casher, ever using a non-bank money order, ever using a 
pawn shop, ever entering into a rent-to-own agreement, or using an RAL in the last five years.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for Households with More than One Adult, by Organization of Household Finances 
 
Overall 
Household Finances Participation in Financial Decisions 
 Shared Some Shared Separate A Lot Some None 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) 
Same Respondent,  
Both Surveys 
0.785 
(0.411) 
0.769  
(0.422) 
0.800    
(0.400) 
0.798   
(0.402) 
0.784 
(0.411) 
0.737 
(0.440) 
0.652 
(0.478) 
Female Respondent,  
Both Surveys 
0.513   
(0.500) 
0.489   
(0.500) 
0.505    
(0.500) 
0.579   
(0.494) 
0.500 
(0.500) 
0.278 
(0.448) 
0.468 
(0.501) 
Demographic Characteristics       
Age of Primary Earner 40.779   (10.115) 
40.180    
(9.506) 
41.800    
(10.850) 
42.078   
(12.493) 
40.605 
(9.766) 
40.085 
(10.049) 
41.462 
(10.231) 
Age of Oldest Child 10.352   (5.255) 
10.155   
(5.218) 
9.987   
(5.332) 
10.468   
(5.247) 
10.110 
(5.257) 
10.044 
(5.173) 
11.785 
(5.012) 
Married Couple 0.782   (0.413) 
0.886   
(0.318) 
0.778    
(0.416) 
0.383   
(0.486) 
0.870 
(0.336) 
0.838 
(0.369) 
0.762 
(0.428) 
White 0.809   (0.393) 
0.839   
(0.367) 
0.785   
(0.411) 
0.710   
(0.454) 
0.835 
(0.372) 
0.796 
(0.403) 
0.770 
(0.423) 
African American, Non-
Hispanic 
0.113   
(0.316) 
0.083   
(0.276) 
0.132   
(0.338) 
0.196   
(0.397) 
0.091 
(0.287) 
0.100 
(0.300) 
0.180 
(0.386) 
Hispanic 0.176   (0.381) 
0.164   
(0.370) 
0.158   
(0.365) 
0.270   
(0.444) 
0.144 
(0.351) 
0.252 
(0.434) 
0.266 
(0.444) 
Native Born Citizen 0.817   (0.387) 
0.816   
(0.388) 
0.836   
(0.371) 
0.780   
(0.414) 
0.840 
(0.366) 
0.734 
(0.442) 
0.599 
(0.492) 
Economic Characteristics       
Less than High School 0.059   (0.235) 
0.057   
(0.231) 
0.033   
(0.179) 
0.071     
(0.257) 
0.045 
(0.208) 
0.079 
(0.270) 
0.110 
(0.315) 
High School 0.209   (0.407) 
0.201   
(0.401) 
0.179   
(0.384) 
0.273   
(0.446) 
0.185 
(0.388) 
0.252 
(0.435) 
0.250 
(0.435) 
Some College 0.313  (0.464) 
0.298   
(0.458) 
0.306   
(0.461) 
0.435   
(0.496) 
0.298 
(0.457) 
0.309 
(0.462) 
0.273 
(0.448) 
Household Income Under 
50% of Poverty 
0.043   
(0.202) 
0.034    
(0.182) 
0.024   
(0.153) 
0.082   
(0.274) 
0.030 
(0.171) 
0.040 
(0.197) 
0.069 
(0.254) 
Household Income 50% -
100% of Poverty 
0.081   
(0.273) 
0.074    
(0.261) 
0.060    
(0.237) 
0.129   
(0.335) 
0.065 
(0.247) 
0.096 
(0.295) 
0.111 
(0.316) 
Household Income 100% 
- 130% of Poverty  
0.077   
(0.267) 
0.070    
(0.255) 
0.067   
(0.251) 
0.129   
(0.335)   
0.062 
(0.242) 
0.104 
(0.306) 
0.100 
(0.302) 
Household Income 130% 
- 185% of Poverty 
0.083    
(0.276) 
0.083    
(0.276) 
0.083   
(0.275) 
0.098   
(0.297) 
0.078 
(0.268) 
0.103 
(0.304) 
0.134 
(0.342) 
Household Income Above 
185% of Poverty  
0.621    
(0.485) 
0.643     
(0.479) 
0.674   
(0.469) 
0.472   
(0.500) 
0.672 
(0.470) 
0.549 
(0.498) 
0.447 
(0.499) 
Missing Income 0.096   (0.294) 
0.096    
(0.295) 
0.092    
(0.289) 
0.091    
(0.288) 
0.093 
(0.290) 
0.107 
(0.310) 
0.139 
(0.347) 
Military 0.015   (0.123) 
0.016    
(0.126) 
0.022   
(0.147) 
0.003   
(0.052) 
0.017 
(0.131) 
0.015 
(0.123) 
0.024 
(0.154) 
Employed Full-Time 0.877   (0.328) 
0.891     
(0.311) 
0.915   
(0.279) 
0.834   
(0.372) 
0.899 
(0.301) 
0.884 
(0.301) 
0.884 
(0.320) 
Employed Part-Time 0.047   (0.211) 
0.045   
(0.206) 
0.034   
(0.180) 
0.062   
(0.240) 
0.040 
(0.197) 
0.040 
(0.197) 
0.051 
(0.219) 
Unemployed 0.030   (0.171) 
0.030    
(0.171) 
0.021   
(0.142) 
0.029   
(0.168) 
0.027 
(0.161) 
0.027 
(0.161) 
0.031 
(0.173) 
Not Employed, Disabled 0.017   (0.130) 
.0137    
(0.116) 
0.009   
(0.095) 
0.015   
(0.123) 
0.012 
(0.109) 
0.012 
(0.109) 
0.016 
(0.126) 
Not Employed, Retired or 
Out of Labor Force 
0.029   
(0.168) 
.0205    
(0.142) 
0.022   
(0.145) 
0.060   
(0.238) 
0.021 
(0.144) 
0.021 
(0.144) 
0.019 
(0.136) 
Unemployment Rate 5.777   (1.103) 
5.772    
(1.126) 
5.783    
(1.056) 
5.808     
(1.066) 
5.762 
(1.113) 
5.817 
(1.091) 
6.062 
(1.225) 
Observations 8,148 5,570 1,478 756 5,861 1,085 118 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All 
sample statistics weighted by the Food Security Supplement (FSS) weight. Standard deviations provided in parentheses. Observations will not 
sum to the overall number due to non-response, volunteered responses, and routing of questionnaire.
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Table 3. Food Security and Use of Food Assistance, by Bank Account Ownership and AFS Use 
     Unbanked    
 All  Banked  All Unbanked 
Previously 
Banked 
Never 
Banked 
 Any 
AFS No AFS 
 (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
Child Food Security Status during 2008          
High Food Security 0.813    (0.390) 
 0.838   
(0.369) 
 0.573    
(0.494) 
0.536   
(0.499) 
0.603  
(0.490) 
 0.719    
(0.450) 
0.878   
(0.328) 
Marginal Food Security 0.081     (0.273) 
 0.075   
(0.264) 
 0.136   
(0.343) 
0.141   
(0.348) 
0.141   
(0.349) 
 0.118 
(0.322) 
0.056   
(0.230) 
Low Food Security 0.093    (0.290) 
 0.077   
(0.267) 
 0.242   
(0.428) 
0.268   
(0.443) 
0.222   
(0.416) 
 0.143   
(0.351) 
0.058    
(0.234) 
Very Low Food Security 0.013    (0.113) 
 0.010   
(0.097) 
 0.046   
(0.209) 
0.055    
(0.228) 
0.033   
(0.180) 
 0.020 
(0.139) 
0.008   
(0.091) 
          
Use of Food Assistance          
SNAP, Last 12 Months 0.139     (0.346) 
 0.098   
(0.298) 
 0.526   
(0.500) 
0.562   
(0.497) 
0.502  
(0.501) 
 0.230  
(0.421) 
0.076  
(0.266) 
Emergency Food, Last 12 Months  0.054    (0.226) 
 0.042   
(0.202) 
 0.166   
(0.372) 
0.171   
(0.377) 
0.168   
(0.374) 
 0.096   
(0.294) 
0.026   
(0.158) 
WIC, Last 30 Days 0.085    (0.279) 
 0.067     
(0.251) 
 0.256    
(0.437) 
0.225   
(0.418) 
0.301     
(0.459) 
 0.133   
(0.340) 
0.052   
(0.222) 
Free/ Reduced Price NSLP, Last 30 Days  0.206    (0.404) 
 0.172   
(0.377) 
 0.529   
(0.500) 
0.556   
(0.498) 
0.503  
(0.501)   
 0.307   
(0.461) 
0.136   
(0.343) 
Free/ Reduced Price NSBP, Last 30 Days 0.155    (0.362) 
 0.125   
(0.330) 
 0.443   
(0.497) 
0.467   
(0.500) 
0.428   
(0.496) 
 0.240   
(0.427) 
0.096   
(0.294) 
           
Observations 9,229  8,497  740 373 338  3,573 5,425 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All sample statistics weighted by the Food Security 
Supplement (FSS) weight. Standard deviations provided in parentheses. AFS products include non-bank check cashers, non-bank money orders, payday loans, pawn loans, rent-to-own agreements, and 
RALs. 
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Table 4. Impact of Bank Account Ownership on Child Food Security 
 Very Low Food Security Food Insecurity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Unbanked Household 
0.017  0.046**  
(0.010)  (0.021)  
Previously Banked Household  
0.026*  0.083*** 
 (0.014)  (0.028) 
Never Banked Household  
0.004  0.004 
 (0.013)  (0.030) 
Married Couple 
-0.006 -0.009** -0.032** -0.034** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.014) (0.014) 
Single Parent 
0.007 0.007 0.049*** 0.048*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) 
African-American, Non-Hispanic 
0.012* 0.011* 0.035** 0.032** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014) 
Hispanic 
0.002 0.004 0.017 0.020 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014) 
Native-born Citizen 
-0.008 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) 
Oldest Child Aged 6 – 14 
0.007** 0.007** 0.034*** 0.035*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) 
Oldest Child Aged 15 - 17 
0.021*** 0.020*** 0.049*** 0.047*** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) 
Primary Earner Age 30 - 39 
0.005 0.004 -0.012 -0.012 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.013) 
Primary Earner Age 40 - 49 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.021 -0.019 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014) 
Primary Earner Age 50 - 59 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.022 -0.021 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.016) 
Primary Earner Age 60 + 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.052** -0.054** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.026) (0.026) 
High School Graduate 
0.029*** 0.028*** 0.012 0.006 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.023) (0.024) 
Some College 
0.029*** 0.026*** -0.001 -0.009 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.023) (0.023) 
College Graduate 
0.025*** 0.022*** -0.019 -0.026 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.024) (0.024) 
More than College 
0.024*** 0.021*** -0.037 -0.045* 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.023) (0.023) 
Employed Part-Time 
-0.001 0.0001 0.014 0.014 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.020) (0.020) 
Unemployed 
0.012 0.013 0.054* 0.053* 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.028) (0.028) 
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Table 4 (cont’d) Very Low Food Security Food Insecurity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Not Employed, Disabled 
0.025 0.028 0.216*** 0.216*** 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.042) (0.042) 
Not Employed, Retired or Out of 
Labor Force 
-0.003 -0.002 0.023 0.024 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.027) (0.027) 
Military 
-0.008** -0.007** -0.058*** -0.057*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.017) (0.018) 
Household Income 100% - 130% of 
Poverty 
-0.020** -0.020** -0.050** -0.055** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.023) (0.023) 
Household Income 130% - 185% of 
Poverty 
-0.024** -0.023** -0.098*** -0.102*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.022) (0.022) 
Household Income Above 185% of 
Poverty 
-0.036*** -0.034*** -0.168*** -0.171*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.018) 
Missing Household Income 
-0.040*** -0.038*** -0.166*** -0.168*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.020) (0.020) 
State Unemployment Rate in 2008 
-0.005** -0.005** -0.007 -0.009 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.019) (0.019) 
Banks Per 1,000 Persons Over Age 
16 
-0.014 -0.014 -0.081** -0.081** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.038) (0.038) 
Constant 
0.022 0.0231 0.233*** 0.249*** 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.085) (0.085) 
State Fixed Effects? YES YES YES YES 
Observations 9,237 9,208 9,237 9,208 
R-squared 0.04 0.039 0.138 0.141 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All 
sample statistics weighted by the Food Security Supplement (FSS) weight. Robust standard errors provided in parentheses. Statistical significance 
is denoted as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5. Food Security and Use of Food Assistance for the Previously Banked, by Time Unbanked and Choice to Close the Account 
 Time Since Owned Account Who Closed Account 
 Within Year More than Year Household Bank 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Child Food Security Status during 2008 
High Food Security 0.533    (0.501) 
0.538    
(0.500) 
0.563    
(0.497) 
0.406   
(0.495) 
Marginal Food Security 0.111    (0.315) 
0.153     
(0.361) 
0.165    
(0.372) 
0.109    
(0.315) 
Low Food Security 0.298   (0.459) 
0.256    
(0.437)   
0.218    
(0.414) 
0.391    
(0.492) 
Very Low Food Security 0.058   (0.236) 
0.053    
(0.225)       
0.054    
(0.226) 
0.094    
(0.294) 
 
Use of Food Assistance 
SNAP, 12 Months 0.466    (0.501) 
0.612    
(0.488) 
0.542  
(0.499) 
0.698    
(0.463) 
Emergency Food, 12 Months 0.115    (0.320) 
0.202    
(0.402) 
0.188   
 (0.392) 
0.344   
 (0.479) 
WIC, 30 Days 0.204      (0.405) 
0.239    
(0.428) 
0.219    
(0.415) 
0.266    
(0.445) 
Free/Reduced Price NSLP, 30 Days 0.422   (0.496) 
0.628    
(0.485) 
0.519    
(0.501) 
0.578    
(0.498) 
Free/Reduced Price NSBP, 30 Days 0.323    (0.470) 
0.546    
(0.499) 
0.413    
(0.493) 
0.516    
(0.504) 
     
Observations 127 242 261 64 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All sample statistics weighted by the Food Security 
Supplement (FSS) weight. Standard deviations provided in parentheses. Sample includes all previously banked households.
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Table 6. Impact of Time Unbanked and Choice to Close the Account on Child Food Security 
 Time Since Owned Account Who Closed the Account 
 Very Low Food 
Security Food Insecurity 
Very Low Food 
Security Food Insecurity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Never Banked 
0.004    0.004 0.004 0.005 
(0.013) (0.030) (0.013) (0.030) 
Previously Banked, Banked Within Last Year 
0.030    0.129*** 
- - (0.024) (0.049) 
Previously Banked, Banked More than One Year Ago 
0.024    0.062* 
- - (0.016) (0.033) 
Previously Banked, Self-Closed - - 
0.020 0.056* 
(0.015) (0.029) 
Previously Banked, Bank Closed - - 
0.058 0.231*** 
(0.038) (0.071) 
 
    
Observations 9,205 9,205 9,208 9,208 
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.143 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All sample statistics weighted by the Food Security 
Supplement (FSS) weight. Robust standard errors provided in parentheses. Covariates include household income relative to poverty, age of the primary earner, age of the oldest child, race/ethnic status, 
nativity, household composition, educational attainment, employment, state unemployment rate, and the supply of banks in the CBSA.. See text for further detail. Statistical significance is denoted as 
follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. Food Security and Use of Food Assistance, by Main Reason for Not Owning a Bank Account 
 Previously Banked: Main Reason for Closing Never Banked: Main Reason for Not Owning an Account 
 
Economic 
Financial 
Management 
Customer 
Service Other Economic 
Financial 
Management 
Customer 
Service Other 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Portion of Subsample 38.80% 8.23% 7.45% 45.51% 52.79% 10.72% 16.38% 20.12% 
Child Food Security         
High Food Security 0.567   (0.499) 
0.601      
(0.504) 
0.352    
(0.488) 
0.587    
(0.495) 
0.500    
(0.502) 
0.655    
(0.483) 
0.688    
(0.468) 
0.687    
(0.468) 
Marginal Food Security 0.199   (0.402) 
0.075    
(0.271) 
0.118    
(0.329) 
0.136    
(0.345) 
0.167    
(0.375) 
0.037    
(0.191) 
0.186    
(0.393) 
0.141    
(0.352) 
Low Food Security 0.174   (0.382) 
0.193    
(0.406) 
0.530    
(0.510) 
0.230    
(0.422)   
0.301    
(0.460) 
0.240    
(0.433) 
0.126    
(0.335) 
0.146    
(0.356) 
Very Low Food Security 0.060   (0.240) 
0.131    
(0.347) - 
0.047   
(0.213) 
0.031 
(0.175) 
0.069 
(0.256) - 
0.026    
(0.159) 
        
Use of Food Assistance        
SNAP, Last 12 Months 0.504   (0.503) 
0.640    
(0.494) 
0.662   
(0.484) 
0.550   
(0.500) 
0.487 
(0.502) 
0.646 
(0.486) 
0.421    
(0.499)  
0.516 
(0.504) 
Emergency Food, Last 12 
Months 
0.162   
(0.371) 
0.274    
(0.459) 
0.205   
(0.413) 
0.156   
(0.364) 
0.187 
(0.392) 
0.251 
(0.440) 
0.133 
(0.343) 
0.168 
(0.377) 
WIC, Last 30 Days 0.213   (0.412) 
0.264    
(0.454) 
0.036   
(0.191) 
0.213   
(0.411) 
0.272 
(0.446) 
0.230 
(0.427) 
0.280 
(0.453) 
0.396 
(0.493) 
Free/Reduced Price NSLP, 
Last 30 Days 
0.640   
(0.483) 
0.702    
(0.471) 
0.661   
(0.484) 
0.466   
(0.501) 
0.272 
(0.446) 
0.664 
(0.480) 
0.411 
(0.497) 
0.483 
 (0.504) 
Free/Reduced Price NSBP, 
Last 30 Days 
0.520   
(0.503) 
0.629    
(0.497) 
0.576   
(0.505) 
0.356   
(0.481) 
0.432 
(0.497) 
0.596 
(0.499) 
0.361 
(0.485) 
0.389 
(0.492) 
         
Observations 82 20 25 111 137 33 53 62 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All sample statistics weighted by the Food Security 
Supplement (FSS) weight. Standard deviations provided in parentheses. Sample includes only unbanked households that either closed an account themselves or were never banked. 
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Table 8. Impact of State Banking Policies and Banked Status, on Child Food Security 
 Very Low Food Security Food Insecurity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
State Lifeline Legislation 0.002    (0.006) - 
-0.007    
(0.012) - 
     
Formerly Banked, State Has Lifeline 
Legislation 
-0.008    
(0.042) - 
-0.039     
(0.077) - 
Formerly Banked, State Doesn’t Have 
Lifeline Legislation 
0.026*    
(0.014) - 
0.088**    
(0.030) - 
     
Never Banked, State Has Lifeline 
Legislation 
-0.020   
(0.027) - 
-0.053    
(0.070) - 
Never Banked, State Doesn’t Have 
Lifeline Legislation 
0.008    
(0.014) - 
0.017     
(0.033) - 
     
State Regulates Check Cashers - 0.004*    (0.002) - 
0.009    
(0.008) 
     
Formerly Banked, State Regulates 
Check Cashers - 
-0.019      
(0.030) - 
0.024    
(0.057) 
Formerly Banked, State Doesn’t 
Regulate Check Cashers - 
0.038     
(0.026) - 
0.066    
(0.048) 
     
Never Banked, State Regulates Check 
Cashers - 
0.019    
(0.016) - 
0.027    
(0.057) 
Never Banked, State Doesn’t Regulate 
Check Cashers - 
-0.011    
(0.009) - 
-0.013    
(0.049) 
     
Observations 9,208 9,208 9,208 9,208 
Notes: Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey 
(CPS). All estimates weighted by the Food Security Supplement (FSS) weight. Robust standard errors provided in parentheses. Covariates 
include household income relative to poverty, age of the primary earner, age of the oldest child, race/ethnic status, nativity, household 
composition, educational attainment, employment, state unemployment rate, and the supply of banks in the CBSA. Rather than state fixed effects, 
the equation includes three policies in effect in 2008: Maximum State EITC for two children, state minimum wage, and Democratic Governor. 
All coefficients reported relative to banked households. See text for further detail. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9. Impact of AFS Products on Child Food Security 
 
Very Low Food Security Food Insecurity 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ever Used Any AFS Product 0.004  
0.045*** 
 (0.003) 
 
(0.008) 
 
Number of AFS Products Ever Used  
0.006** 
 
0.039*** 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.005) 
Married Couple -0.006 -0.006 -0.034** -0.036*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.014) 
Single Parent 0.007 0.006 0.046*** 0.042*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) 
African-American, Non-Hispanic 0.014** 0.013* 0.036** 0.032** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.014) 
Hispanic 0.003 0.003 0.018 0.020 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.013) 
Native-born Citizen -0.008 -0.010* -0.008 -0.013 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) 
Oldest Child Aged 6 - 14 0.006** 0.006** 0.034*** 0.032*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008) 
Oldest Child Aged 15 - 17 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) 
Primary Earner Age 30 -39 0.004 0.005 -0.012 -0.011 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.013) 
Primary Earner Age 40 - 49 -0.002 -0.001 -0.020 -0.015 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014) 
Primary Earner Age 50 - 59 -0.002 -0.001 -0.022 -0.017 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.016) 
Primary Earner Age 60 + -0.002 -0.001 -0.057** -0.050** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.026) (0.026) 
High School Graduate 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.006 0.005 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.023) (0.023) 
Some College 0.026*** 0.026*** -0.007 -0.007 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.023) (0.023) 
College Graduate 0.022*** 0.023*** -0.021 -0.016 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.023) (0.023) 
More than College 0.021*** 0.023*** -0.038* -0.032 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.023) (0.023) 
Employed Part-Time 0.0002 0.0001 0.017 0.016 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.020) (0.020) 
Unemployed 0.014 0.012 0.055** 0.045 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.028) (0.028) 
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Table 9 (cont’d) Very Low Food Security Food Insecurity 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Not Employed, Disabled 0.027 0.027 0.223*** 0.225*** 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.042) (0.042) 
Not Employed, Retired or Out of Labor Force -0.0003 0.0002 0.034 0.036 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.027) (0.027) 
Military -0.008** -0.008** -0.063*** -0.060*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.018) (0.017) 
Household Income 100% - 130% of Poverty -0.023** -0.022** -0.054** -0.053** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.023) (0.023) 
Household Income 130% - 185% of Poverty -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.106*** -0.103*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.022) (0.022) 
Household Above 185% of Poverty -0.039*** -0.037*** -0.170*** -0.161*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.018) 
Missing Household Income -0.041*** -0.039*** -0.165*** -0.155*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.019) 
State Unemployment Rate in 2008 -0.005** -0.005** -0.007 -0.008 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.019) (0.019) 
Banks, per 1,000 Persons Over Age 16 -0.014 -0.014 -0.082** -0.080** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.038) (0.037) 
Constant 0.028* 0.025 0.231*** 0.221*** 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.085) (0.085) 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 9,237 9,237 9,237 9,237 
R-squared 0.039 0.041 0.141 0.151 
Notes: Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey 
(CPS). All estimates weighted by the Food Security Supplement (FSS) weight. Robust standard errors provided in parentheses. Covariates 
include household income relative to poverty, age of the primary earner, age of the oldest child, race/ethnic status, nativity, household 
composition, educational attainment, employment, state unemployment rate, and the supply of banks in the CBSA.. See text for further detail. 
Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10. Food Security and Use of Food Assistance for Users of AFS products, by Product 
 Financial Transaction Services  Credit Services 
 Check Casher Money Order  Payday Lender Pawn Shop Rent-to-Own RAL 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Among All AFS Users 31.43% 79.65%  13.16% 17.01% 14.00% 14.13% 
Unbanked Households 59.78% 84.62%  10.26% 21.30% 19.35% 18.29% 
Banked Households 25.73% 78.65%  13.74% 16.14% 12.92% 13.29% 
        
Child Food Security        
High Food Security 0.641    (0.480) 
0.721    
(0.448) 
 0.590 
(0.492) 
0.562   
(0.497) 
0.579 
(0.494) 
0.570    
(0.496) 
Marginal Food Security 0.132    (0.339) 
0.115    
(0.320) 
 0.150 
(0.357) 
0.157    
(0.364) 
0.170    
(0.376) 
0.166   
(0.372) 
Low Food Security 0.202    (0.402) 
0.144    
(0.351) 
 0.224   
(0.418) 
0.231    
(0.422) 
0.211   
(0.408) 
0.225    
(0.418) 
Very Low Food Security 0.025    (0.156) 
0.020    
(0.139) 
 0.035    
(0.185)   
0.051    
(0.221) 
0.039    
(0.195) 
0.040   
(0.196) 
        
Use of Food Assistance        
SNAP, Last 12 Months 0.319    (0.466) 
0.238   
(0.426)   
 0.269    
(0.444)  
0.347    
(0.476)   
0.405    
(0.491) 
0.315    
 (0.465) 
Emergency Food, Last 12 Months 0.144     (0.352)      
0.097    
(0.296) 
 0.154    
(0.362) 
0.177    
(0.382) 
0.179    
(0.384) 
0.157    
 (0.364) 
WIC, Last 30 Days 0.160    (0.366) 
0.139    
(0.346) 
 0.171    
(0.377) 
0.157    
(0.364) 
0.191    
(0.394) 
0.193    
(0.395) 
Free/ Reduced Price NSLP, Last 30 Days 0.364      (0.481) 
0.313    
(0.464)  
 0.392   
(0.489) 
0.409    
(0.492) 
0.491    
(0.500) 
0.485    
(0.500) 
Free/ Reduced Price NSBP, Last 30 Days 0.287    (0.453) 
0.249    
(0.433) 
 0.296    
(0.457) 
0.327    
(0.469) 
0.410    
(0.492) 
0.375   
 (0.485) 
        
Observations 1,087 2,852  451 647 517 483 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All sample statistics weighted by the Food Security 
Supplement (FSS) weight. Standard deviations provided in parentheses. Sample includes only households that ever used any of these AFS products. Households could use more than one product so 
observations will not sum up to the sample size. 
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Table 11. Child Food Security and Food Assistance, by Frequency of Use for Non-Bank Check Cashers and Non-Bank Money Order 
 Non-Bank Check Casher  Non-Bank Money Order 
 At Least a Few 
Times a Year 
Once or Twice 
a Year Almost Never 
 At Least a Few 
Times a Year 
Once or 
Twice a Year Almost Never 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Portion of Households 53.99% 20.14% 25.87%  43.35% 23.86% 32.78% 
        
Child Food Security        
High Food Security 0.616  (0.487) 
0.581    
(0.495) 
0.742    
(0.438) 
 0.629    
(0.483) 
0.727    
(0.446) 
0.838    
(0.369) 
Marginal Food Security 0.141  (0.349) 
0.171    
(0.378) 
0.088    
(0.284) 
 0.140    
(0.348) 
0.122    
(0.328) 
0.076    
(0.266) 
Low Food Security 0.209    (0.407) 
0.220    
(0.415) 
0.165    
(0.372) 
 0.200    
(0.400) 
0.134    
(0.341) 
0.077    
(0.267) 
Very Low Food Security 0.034    (0.182) 
0.028    
(0.166)   
0.004    
(0.066) 
 0.030     
(0.172) 
0.016    
(0.126) 
0.008    
(0.090) 
        
Use of Food Assistance        
SNAP, Last 12 Months 0.384 (0.487) 
0.292 
(0.456) 
0.208 
(0.406) 
 0.368 
(0.483) 
0.196 
(0.397) 
0.095 
(0.294) 
Emergency Food, Last 12 Months 0.172 (0.378) 
0.140 
(0.347) 
0.085 
(0.280) 
 0.144 
(0.351) 
0.090 
(0.286) 
0.039 
(0.194) 
WIC, Last 30 Days 0.177 (0.382) 
0.167 
(0.373) 
0.116 
(0.320) 
 0.211 
(0.408) 
0.119 
(0.324) 
0.061 
(0.239) 
Free/ Reduced Price NSLP, Last 30 Days 0.430 (0.496) 
0.349 
(0.478) 
0.253 
(0.435) 
 0.458 
(0.498) 
0.310 
(0.463) 
0.127 
(0.333) 
Free/ Reduced Price NSBP, Last 30 Days 0.355 (0.479) 
0.233 
(0.424) 
0.199 
(0.400) 
 0.364 
(0.481) 
0.246 
(0.431) 
0.102 
(0.303) 
        
Observations 536 218 321  1,135 662 1,048 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All sample statistics weighted by the Food Security 
Supplement (FSS) weight. Standard errors provided in parentheses. Sample includes only households that ever used either a non-bank check casher or non-bank money order. Households could use 
more than one product so observations will not sum up to the sample size. 
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Table 12. Impact of Non-Bank Check Cashers and Non-Bank Money Orders on Child Food Security 
 
Very Low Food Security  Food Insecurity 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8 (9) (10) 
Every Used Check Casher or 
Money Order 
0.002 
- - - - 
 0.036*** 
- - - - 
(0.003)  (0.007) 
Ever Used Check Casher - 
0.003 
- - - 
 
- 
0.068*** 
- - - 
(0.006)  (0.015) 
Ever Used Money Order - - 
0.003 
- - 
 
- - 
0.035*** 
- - 
(0.003)  (0.009) 
Use Check Casher at Least a 
Few Times a Year - - - 
0.007 
- 
 
- - - 
0.071*** 
- 
(0.008)  (0.018) 
Use Money Order at Least a 
Few Times a Year - - - - 
0.003  
- - - - 
0.043**
* 
(0.005)  (0.012) 
  
         
 Observations 9,237 9,011 8,992 9,011 8,992  9,237 9,011 8,992 9,011 8,992 
R-squared 0.039 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041  0.142 0.146 0.143 0.145 0.143 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All estimates weighted by the Food Security Supplement 
(FSS) weight. Robust standard errors provided in parentheses. Covariates include household income relative to poverty, age of the primary earner, age of the oldest child, race/ethnic status, nativity, 
household composition, educational attainment, employment, state unemployment rate, and the supply of banks in the CBSA.. See text for further detail. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13. Impact of Non-Bank Check Cashers and Non-Bank Money Orders on Child Food Security, by Banked Status 
 
Very Low Food Security Food Insecurity Very Low Food Security Food Insecurity 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Unbanked Banked Unbanked Banked Unbanked Banked Unbanked Banked 
Ever Use a Non-Bank Check Casher -0.017 0.006 0.024 0.070***     (0.019) (0.006) (0.040) (0.016) 
    
 
        
Ever Use a Non-Bank Money Order     
-0.005 0.003 0.030 0.033*** 
    
(0.019) (0.003) (0.042) (0.008) 
         Observations 700 8,311 700 8,311 699 8,293 699 8,293 
R-squared 0.102 0.038 0.131 0.136 0.101 0.038 0.129 0.133 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All estimates weighted by the Food Security Supplement 
(FSS) weight. Robust standard errors provided in parentheses. Covariates include household income relative to poverty, age of the primary earner, age of the oldest child, race/ethnic status, nativity, 
household composition, educational attainment, employment, state unemployment rate, and the supply of banks in the CBSA.. See text for further detail. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 14. Main Reason used a Check Casher or Money Order Rather than a Bank 
 Non-Bank Check Casher  Non-Bank Money Order 
 
Economic 
Customer 
Service Other 
 
Economic 
Customer 
Service Other 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Portion of Users 44.07% 45.93% 10.00%  23.17% 66.56% 10.27% 
        
Child Food Security        
High Food Security 0.574   (0.495) 
0.708    
(0.455) 
0.616    
(0.489) 
 0.674    
(0.469) 
0.742    
(0.438) 
0.680    
(0.467) 
Marginal Food Security 0.138    (0.345) 
0.112  
(0.316) 
0.214    
(0.412) 
 0.110    
(0.313) 
0.114    
(0.318) 
0.140   
(0.348) 
Low Food Security 0.252    (0.435) 
0.164   
 (0.371) 
0.148    
(0.357) 
 0.183    
(0.387) 
0.129    
(0.335) 
0.158    
(0.365) 
Very Low Food Security 0.036   (0.187) 
0.015    
(0.122) 
0.023     
(0.149) 
 0.034    
(0.180) 
0.015 
(0.120) 
0.022   
(0.148)   
        
Use of Food Assistance        
SNAP, Last 12 Months 0.385    (0.487) 
0.280    
(0.449) 
0.238 
(0.428) 
 0.296 
(0.457) 
0.217 
(0.412) 
0.256 
(0.437) 
Emergency Food, Last 12 Months 0.157 (0.364) 
0.140 
(0.347) 
0.097 
(0.297) 
 0.135 
(0.342) 
0.081 
(0.273) 
0.116 
(0.321) 
WIC, Last 30 Days 0.171    (0.377) 
0.149    
(0.356) 
0.136 
(0.344) 
 0.146 
(0.353) 
0.138 
(0.345) 
0.131 
(0.338) 
Free/ Reduced Price NSLP, Last 30 Days 0.411 (0.493) 
0.333 
(0.472) 
0.312 
(0.465) 
 0.375 
(0.484) 
0.293 
(0.456) 
0.313 
(0.464) 
Free/ Reduced Price NSBP, Last 30 Days 0.336 (0.473) 
0.256 
(0.437) 
0.221 
(0.417) 
 0.291 
(0.455) 
0.237 
(0.425) 
0.246 
(0.431) 
        
Observations 430 534 100  658 1,877 297 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All sample statistics weighted by the Food Security 
Supplement (FSS) weight. Standard deviations provided in parentheses. Sample only includes those that ever used either a non-bank check casher or non-bank money order. Households could use more 
than one product so observations will not sum up to the sample size.
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Table 15. Impact of AFS Products Providing Credit on Child Food Security 
 
Very Low Food Security  Food Insecurity 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Ever Use Any AFS 
Product Providing Credit 
0.014*** 
    
 0.067*** 
    (0.004) 
    
 (0.009) 
    
Ever Use a Pawn Loan  
0.034*** 
   
 
 
0.134*** 
   
 
(0.010) 
   
 
 
(0.020) 
   
Ever Use a Payday Loan   
0.018* 
  
 
  
0.119*** 
  
  
(0.010) 
  
 
  
(0.023) 
  Ever Use a Rent-to-Own 
Agreement    
0.018* 
 
 
   
0.066*** 
 
   
(0.009) 
 
 
   
(0.021) 
 Ever Use a Refund 
Anticipation Loan     
0.018*  
    
0.103*** 
    
(0.010)  
    
(0.022) 
      
 
     Observations 9,237 9,006 9,004 8,993 8,987  9,237 9,006 9,004 8,993 8,987 
R-squared 0.044 0.046 0.042 0.041 0.042  0.153 0.153 0.148 0.142 0.146 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All estimates weighted by the Food Security Supplement 
(FSS) weight. Robust standard errors provided in parentheses. Covariates include household income relative to poverty, age of the primary earner, age of the oldest child, race/ethnic status, nativity, 
household composition, educational attainment, employment, state unemployment rate, and the supply of banks in the CBSA.. See text for further detail. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 16. Food Security and Food Assistance, by Frequency of Use of AFS Products, for Pawn Shops and Rent-to-Own Stores 
 Pawn Shop Rent-to-Own 
 
At Least a Few 
Times a Year 
Once or Twice a 
Year Almost Never 
At Least a 
Few Times a 
Year 
Once or Twice a 
Year Almost Never 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Portion of Households 13.48% 26.30% 60.22% 13.97% 38.46% 47.57% 
       
Child Food Security       
High Food Security 0.354    (0.481) 
0.532    
(0.501) 
0.619    
(0.486) 
0.558    
(0.500) 
0.545    
(0.499) 
0.612    
(0.488) 
Marginal Food Security 0.140    (0.349) 
0.168    
(0.375) 
0.156    
(0.364) 
0.176    
(0.383) 
0.226   
(0.419) 
0.123    
(0.330) 
Low Food Security 0.362    (0.483) 
0.253    
(0.436) 
0.192    
(0.395) 
0.174    
(0.382) 
0.199     
(0.401) 
0.233     
(0.423) 
Very Low Food Security 0.144    (0.353) 
0.048    
(0.213) 
0.032    
(0.177) 
0.092    
(0.292) 
0.029    
(0.168) 
0.032    
(0.177) 
       
Use of Food Assistance       
SNAP, Last 12 Months 0.539 (0.502) 
0.445 
(0.499) 
0.263 
(0.441) 
0.561 
(0.500) 
0.399 
(0.489) 
0.374 
(0.485) 
Emergency Food, Last 12 Months 0.325 (0.471) 
0.149 
(0.357) 
0.156 
(0.364) 
0.259 
(0.441) 
0.165 
(0.375) 
0.169 
(0.375) 
WIC, Last 30 Days 0.173 (0.381) 
0.168 
(0.375) 
0.149 
(0.357) 
0.237 
(0.428) 
0.209 
(0.407) 
0.165 
(0.372) 
Free/ Reduced Price NSLP, Last 30 Days 0.530 (0.502) 
0.544 
(0.500) 
0.322 
(0.468) 
0.620 
(0.489) 
0.535 
(0.500) 
0.418 
(0.494) 
Free/ Reduced Price NSBP, Last 30 Days 0.416 (0.496) 
0.445 
(0.498) 
0.252 
(0.435) 
0.536 
(0.502) 
0.442 
(0.498) 
0.348 
(0.477) 
       
Observations 81 163 402 71 191 254 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All sample statistics weighted by the Food Security 
Supplement (FSS) weight. Standard deviations provided in parentheses. Sample includes only households that reported ever using a pawn shop or rent-to-own agreement. Households could use more 
than one product so observations will not sum up to the sample size.
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Table 17. Impact of Frequency of Pawn Shop and Rent-to-Own Contracts on Child Food Security 
 
Very Low Food Security  Food Insecurity 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Used Pawn Shop At Least a Few 
Times a Year or Once or Twice a 
Year 
0.056*** 
 
   0.170***  
  
(0.021) 
 
  
 
(0.034)  
  Used Rent-to-Own Contract at 
Least a Few Times a Year or 
Once or Twice a Year  
 
0.011    
 
0.097*** 
  
 
(0.012)   
 
 
(0.030) 
  Used Pawn Shop At Least a Few 
Times a Year   
0.120***   
 
 0.288*** 
 
  
(0.044)     (0.059) 
 Used Pawn Shop Once or Twice a 
Year   
0.026   
 
 0.124*** 
 
  
(0.021)   
 
 (0.040) 
 
Use Pawn Shop Almost Never   
0.020*   
 
 0.106*** 
 
  
(0.010)   
 
 (0.024) 
 Used Rent-to-Own At Least a 
Few Times a Year   
 0.063*  
 
 
 
0.046 
  
 (0.037)  
 
 
 
(0.056) 
Used Rent-to-Own Once or Twice 
a Year   
 0.007  
 
 
 
0.033 
  
 (0.012)  
 
 
 
(0.032) 
Used Rent-to-Own Almost Never   
 0.013  
 
 
 
0.100*** 
  
 (0.012)  
 
 
 
(0.030) 
   
   
 
 
  Observations 9,006 9,237 9,005 8,992  9,006 9,237 9,005 8,992 
R-squared 0.047 0.039 0.053 0.042  0.15 0.139 0.156 0.143 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All estimates weighted by the Food Security Supplement 
(FSS) weight. Robust standard errors provided in parentheses. Covariates include household income relative to poverty, age of the primary earner, age of the oldest child, race/ethnic status, nativity, 
household composition, educational attainment, employment, state unemployment rate, and the supply of banks in the CBSA.. See text for further detail. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 18. Child Food Security and Food Assistance, by Main Reason for Using a Pawn Loan 
 Economic Customer Service Other 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Portion of Households 45.43% 39.10% 15.47% 
    
Child Food Security    
High Food Security 0.490    (0.501) 
0.559    
(0.498) 
0.395   
 (0.492) 
Marginal Food Security 0.120    (0.326) 
0.202    
(0.403) 
0.238   
 (0.429) 
Low Food Security 0.309    (0.463) 
0.220    
(0.415) 
0.246   
 (0.434) 
Very Low Food Security 0.081    (0.273) 
0.019    
(0.138) 
0.120   
(0.327) 
    
Use of Food Assistance    
SNAP Receipt, Last 12 Months 0.420 (0.495) 
0.377 
(0.486) 
0.359 
(0.483) 
Emergency Food Receipt, Last 12 Months 0.188 (0.391) 
0.193 
(0.395) 
0.264 
(0.444) 
WIC Receipt, Last 30 Days 0.172 (0.378) 
0.151 
(0.359) 
0.212 
(0.412) 
Free/ Reduced Price NSLP, Last 30 Days 0.506 (0.501) 
0.386 
(0.488) 
0.446 
(0.501) 
Free/ Reduced Price NSBP, Last 30 Days 0.406 (0.492) 
0.297 
(0.458) 
0.411 
(0.495) 
    
Observations 225 185 72 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS).  
All sample statistics weighted by the Food Security Supplement (FSS) weight. Standard deviations provided in parentheses. Sample includes 
households that ever used a pawn shop. Households could use more than one product so observations will not sum up to the sample size. 
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Table 19. Food Security and Food Assistance Use, by Frequency of Payday Lending Use Over the Past 12 Months for Users of Payday Loans 
 Zero Once Twice 3-5 Times 6-10 times 11- 15 Times 16 – 20 Times 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Percent of Payday Users 10.00% 34.57% 18.04% 18.91% 10.00% 4.35% 4.13% 
        
Child Food Security        
High Food Security 0.732    (0.448) 
0.629    
(0.485) 
0.624   
 (0.487) 
0.493    
(0.503) 
0.614    
(0.492) 
0.460    
(0.511) 
0.398    
(0.504) 
Marginal Food Security 0.191   (0.398) 
0.139    
(0.347) 
0.106      
(0.310) 
0.179    
(0.386) 
0.129    
(0.339) 
0.140    
(0.356) 
0.232    
(0.434) 
Low Food Security 0.077    (0.270) 
0.212     
(0.410) 
0.246    
(0.433) 
0.258    
(0.440) 
0.209    
(0.411) 
0.360    
(0.493) 
0.287    
(0.465) 
Very Low Food Security - 0.021     (0.142) 
0.024    
(0.153) 
0.069      
(0.255) 
0.048    
(0.216) 
0.040    
(0.202) 
0.083   
(0.284) 
        
Use of Food Assistance        
SNAP Receipt, Last 12 Months 0.255    (0.441) 
0.274 
(0.447) 
0.231 
(0.424) 
0.286 
(0.455) 
0.321 
(0.472) 
0.257 
(0.448) 
0.217 
(0.424) 
Emergency Food Receipt, Last 12 Months 0.125  (0.335) 
0.177 
(0.383) 
0.131 
(0.339) 
0.139 
(0.348) 
0.171 
(0.381) 
0.229 
(0.431) 
0.081 
(0.2813) 
WIC Receipt, Last 30 Days 0.108   (0.314) 
0.164 
(0.372) 
0.175 
(0.382) 
0.124 
(0.331) 
0.244 
(0.435) 
0.313 
(0.476) 
0.273 
(0.459) 
Free/ Reduced Price NSLP, Last 30 Days 0.351    (0.483) 
0.328 
(0.471) 
0.466 
(0.502) 
0.390 
(0.491) 
0.340 
(0.479) 
0.555 
(0.510) 
0.677 
(0.481) 
Free/ Reduced Price NSBP, Last 30 Days 0.244    (0.435) 
0.234 
(0.425) 
0.384 
(0.489) 
0.277 
(0.450) 
0.281 
(0.454) 
0.451 
(0.511) 
0.536 
(0.513) 
        
Observations 46 156 81 86 45 20 18 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All sample statistics weighted by the Food Security 
Supplement (FSS) weight. Standard deviations provided in parentheses. Sample includes only those households that reported ever using a payday loan.
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Table 20. Impact of Frequency of Payday Loan Use Over the Past 12 Months on Child Food Security 
 
Very Low Food Security Food Insecurity 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of Payday Loans 
During Last 12 Months 
0.004**  0.017*** 
 (0.002)  (0.004) 
 1 Payday Loan During Last 12 
Months  
-0.001 
 
0.078*** 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.029) 
2 Payday Loans During Last 12 
Months  
0.011 
 
0.141** 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.054) 
3 – 5 Payday Loans During Last 
12 Months  
0.050* 
 
0.188*** 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.047) 
6 – 10 Payday Loans During 
Last 12 Months  
0.031 
 
0.123* 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.063) 
11 – 15 Payday Loans During 
Last 12 Months  
0.027 
 
0.246** 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.118) 
16 – 20 Payday Loans During 
Last 12 Months  
0.062 
 
0.226 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.140) 
  
 
  Observations 8,911 9,004 8,911 9,004 
R-squared 0.043 0.044 0.146 0.151 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All 
estimates weighted by the Food Security Supplement (FSS) weight. Robust standard errors provided in parentheses. Covariates include household 
income relative to poverty, age of the primary earner, age of the oldest child, race/ethnic status, nativity, household composition, educational 
attainment, employment, state unemployment rate, and the supply of banks in the CBSA.. See text for further detail. Statistical significance is 
denoted as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 21. Child Food Security Status and Food Assistance, by Main Reason used a Payday Lender 
 Economic Customer Service Other 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Portion of Households 66.18% 24.14% 9.68% 
    
Child Food Security    
High Food Security 0.552    (0.498) 
0.653    
(0.478) 
0.596    
(0.496) 
Marginal Food Security 0.140    (0.348) 
0.180    
(0.386) 
0.177   
(0.386) 
Low Food Security 0.268  (0.444) 
0.126 
 (0.334) 
0.227    
(0.423) 
Very Low Food Security 0.040    (0.195) 
0.042   
(0.201) - 
    
Use of Food Assistance    
SNAP Receipt, Last 12 Months 0.276 (0.448) 
0.238 
(0.428) 
0.298 
(0.463) 
Emergency Food Receipt, Last 12 Months 0.164 (0.371) 
0.131 
(0.339) 
0.148 
(0.359) 
WIC Receipt, Last 30 Days 0.174 (0.380) 
0.142 
(0.351) 
0.236 
(0.429) 
Free/ Reduced Price NSLP, Last 30 Days 0.388 (0.488) 
0.381 
(0.488) 
0.399 
(0.495) 
Free/ Reduced Price NSBP, Last 30 Days 0.300 (0.459) 
0.295 
(0.458) 
0.225 
(0.422) 
    
Observations 283 110 45 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All 
sample statistics weighted by the Food Security Supplement (FSS) weight. Standard deviations provided in parentheses. Sample includes 
households that ever used a payday lender.
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Table 22. Child Food Security and Food Assistance, by Main Purpose of Use of Payday Loan, RAL, Rent-to-Own Agreement, or Pawn Shop Use during the Past 
12 Months 
 
Lost Income 
Basic Living 
Expenses 
House Repairs 
or Appliance 
Medical 
Expenses Car Repairs 
School or 
Childcare 
Special Gifts 
or Luxuries Other 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Portion of Households 15.54% 39.15% 8.66% 2.23% 3.52% 1.31% 6.51% 23.08% 
Child Food Security         
High Food Security 0.573    (0.496) 
0.513    
(0.500) 
0.627     
(0.486) 
0.572     
(0.504) 
0.653    
(0.481) 
0.554    
(0.509) 
0.711    
(0.455) 
0.720    
(0.450) 
Marginal Food Security 0.227    (0.420) 
0.151    
(0.358) 
0.179    
(0.385) 
0.069     
(0.258) 
0.069     
(0.255) 
0.202    
(0.412) 
0.192    
(0.396) 
0.127    
(0.334) 
Low Food Security 0.156    (0.364) 
0.295    
(0.456) 
0.183    
(0.388) 
0.268    
(0.451) 
0.234    
(0.428) 
0.136    
(0.352) 
0.097    
(0.297) 
0.122     
(0.327) 
Very Low Food Security 0.043    (0.204) 
0.041    
(0.200)        
0.011    
(0.106) 
0.091    
(0.293) 
0.044    
(0.208) 
0.107    
(0.317) - 
0.031    
(0.174) 
         
Use of Food Assistance         
SNAP, Last 12 Months 0.319 (0.467) 
0.375 
(0.485) 
0.350 
(0.479) 
0.363 
(0.490) 
0.155 
(0.366) 
0.212 
(0.418) 
0.250 
(0.435) 
0.213 
(0.410) 
Emergency Food, Last 12 Months 0.147    (0.355)    
0.178    
(0.383) 
0.153    
(0.361) 
0.166    
(0.379) 
0.136    
(0.346) 
0.064    
(0.250)    
0.092    
(0.291) 
0.101   
(0.302) 
WIC Receipt, Last 30 Days 0.168 (0.375) 
0.184 
(0.388) 
0.189 
(0.393) 
0.108 
(0.316) 
0.171 
(0.381) 
0.025 
(0.161) 
0.241 
(0.430) 
0.119 
(0.324) 
Free/ Reduced Price NSLP, Last 
30 Days 
0.452    
(0.499) 
0.467    
(0.499) 
0.493    
(0.502) 
0.523    
(0.509) 
0.401     
(0.496) 
0.316     
(0.476) 
0.372    
(0.485) 
0.288    
(0.454) 
Free/ Reduced Price NSBP, Last 
30 Days 
0.320     
(0.468) 
0.378    
(0.486) 
0.403    
(0.492) 
0.447    
(0.507) 
0.311    
(0.468) 
0.316     
(0.476) 
0.260    
(0.441) 
0.225    
(0.418) 
         
Observations 210 532 134 28 50 24 106 361 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All sample statistics weighted by the Food Security 
Supplement (FSS) weight. Standard deviations provided in parentheses. Sample includes only those households that reported using one of these products.
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Table 23.  Impact of Non-Bank Check Cashing and State Regulations on Child Food Security 
 
Very Low Food Security Food Insecurity 
 
(1) (2) 
Ever Used Non-Bank Check Casher in a 
State that Regulates Fees 
0.006 0.072*** 
(0.005) (0.018) 
Ever Used Non-Bank Check Casher in a 
State that Doesn’t Regulate Fees 
-0.012 -0.014 
(0.009) (0.025) 
   Observations 9,011 9,011 
R-squared 0.041 0.146 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All 
estimates weighted by the Food Security Supplement (FSS) weight. Robust standard errors provided in parentheses. Covariates include household 
income relative to poverty, age of the primary earner, age of the oldest child, race/ethnic status, nativity, household composition, educational 
attainment, employment, state unemployment rate, and the supply of banks in the CBSA.. See text for further detail. Statistical significance is 
denoted as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 24. 2SLS Estimates for Effect of Pawn Shop Use on Child Food Security 
Panel A. First Stage Estimates: Effect of State Laws on Ever Using a Pawn Shop 
 (1) (2) (3)    
Pawn Cost Under $10 -0.035*** - -0.017**    (0.009) (0.007)    
Pawn Return - -0.046*** -0.034***    (0.008) (0.009)    
       
F-Statistic 15.14 33.28 22.99    
       
Panel B. Reduced Form Estimates 
 Very Low Food Security Food Insecurity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pawn Cost Under $10 -0.002*  -0.003 -0.014**  -0.011 (0.001)  (0.002) (0.005)  (0.007) 
Pawn Return  -0.002 0.0002  -0.013** -0.005  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.006) (0.008) 
       
Panel C. IV Estimates 
 Very Low Food Security Food Insecurity  
Instrument on Pawn Shop Use: (1) (2)   
Pawn Cost Under $10 0.094* 0.381***   (0.055) (0.137)   
Pawn Return 0.051 0.269**   (0.042) (0.122)   
Both 0.066 0.307***   (0.043) (0.112)   
       
 Observations 9,006 9,006   
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All 
estimates weighted by the Food Security Supplement (FSS) weight. Robust standard errors provided in parentheses. Covariates include household 
income relative to poverty, age of the primary earner, age of the oldest child, race/ethnic status, nativity, household composition, educational 
attainment, employment, state unemployment rate, and the supply of banks in the CBSA. See text for further detail. Statistical significance is 
denoted as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 25. Impact of Use of Rent-to-Own Contracts on Food Security of Children, by State Disclosure Requirements 
 Very Low Food Security Food Insecurity 
 No Disclosure 
Requirements 
Disclosure 
Requirements 
No Disclosure 
Requirements 
Disclosure 
Requirements 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Rent-to-Own 
Contract 
0.018 0.017* 0.258** 0.059** 
(0.049) (0.010) (0.050) (0.022) 
     
Observations 612 8,381 612 8,381 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All 
estimates weighted by the Food Security Supplement (FSS) weight. Robust standard errors provided in parentheses. Covariates include household 
income relative to poverty, age of the primary earner, age of the oldest child, race/ethnic status, nativity, household composition, educational 
attainment, employment, state unemployment rate, and the supply of banks in the CBSA.. See text for further detail. Statistical significance is 
denoted as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 26. 2SLS Estimates for Effect of Payday Loan Use on Food Security of Children 
Panel A. First Stage Estimates   
 (1)  
State Payday Lending Ban -0.042***  
 (0.006)  
   
F Statistic 62.25  
   
Panel B. Reduced Form Estimates   
 Very Low Food Security Food Insecurity 
 (1) (2) 
State Payday Lending Bans -0.0001 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.009) 
   
Panel C. IV Estimates   
 Very Low Food Security Food Insecurity 
 (1) (2) 
Payday Loan in Last Year 0.028 -0.031 
 (0.034) (0.189) 
   
Observations 9,018 9,018 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All 
estimates weighted by the Food Security Supplement (FSS) weight. Robust standard errors provided in parentheses. Covariates include household 
income relative to poverty, age of the primary earner, age of the oldest child, race/ethnic status, nativity, household composition, educational 
attainment, employment, state unemployment rate, and the supply of banks in the CBSA.. See text for further detail. Statistical significance is 
denoted as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 27. Food Security and Food Assistance Use, by Extent of Financial Resource Sharing for Two Adult Households, Weighted 
Adults Have: 
Overall Shared Finances 
Some Shared & 
Some Separate Separate Finances 
I am only adult 
(volunteer) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Overall  - 68.01% 17.89% 9.72% 4.38% 
      
Child Food Security Status During 2008      
High Food Security 0.835 (0.371) 
0.850   
(0.357) 
0.865 
(0.342) 
0.755 
(0.431) 
0.653 
(0.477) 
Marginal Food Security 0.074 (0.262) 
0.071 
(0.257) 
0.063 
(0.243) 
0.100 
(0.301) 
0.101 
(0.313) 
Low Food Security 0.078 (0.269) 
0.071 
(0.256) 
0.059 
(0.236) 
0.112 
(0.315) 
0.204 
(0.404) 
Very Low Food Security 0.013 (0.111) 
0.008 
(0.090) 
0.013 
(0.111) 
0.033 
(0.179) 
0.034 
(0.180) 
      
Use of Food Assistance      
SNAP, Last 12 Months 0.108 (0.311) 
0.088 
(0.238) 
0.085 
(0.279) 
0.216 
(0.412) 
0.279 
(0.449) 
Emergency Food, Last 12 Months 0.046 (0.210) 
0.041 
(0.199) 
0.040 
(0.196) 
0.080 
(0.271) 
0.078 
(0.268) 
WIC, Last 30 Days 0.078 (0.268) 
0.070 
(0.255) 
0.074 
(0.262) 
0.142 
(0.349) 
0.078 
(0.269) 
Free or Reduced Price NSLP, Last 30 Days 0.179 (0.383) 
0.154 
(0.361) 
0.139 
(0.346) 
0.324 
(0.468) 
0.399 
(0.490) 
Free or Reduced Price NSBP, Last 30 Days 0.134 (0.340) 
0.115 
(0.319) 
0.098 
(0.297) 
0.255 
(0.436) 
0.313 
(0.464) 
      
Observations 8,148 5,567 1,476 754 344 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children and more than one adult in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All sample statistics weighted by 
the Food Security Supplement (FSS) weight. Standard deviations provided in parentheses. 
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Table 28. Impact of Financial Resource Sharing on Food Security Outcomes for Households with More than One 
Adult 
 
Very Low Food Security Food Insecurity 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Complete Share -0.008**  
-0.007 
 (0.004) 
 
(0.008) 
 
Some Share  
-0.013* 
 
-0.022 
 
(0.0078) 
 
(0.016) 
Married Couple -0.010 -0.011* -0.048*** -0.052*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.017) 
Single Parent 0.013* 0.012 0.039*** 0.035** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.015) 
African-American, Non-Hispanic 0.016* 0.016** 0.029* 0.029* 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.015) 
Hispanic 0.0003 0.00004 0.015 0.015 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014) 
Native-born Citizen -0.011* -0.011* -0.018 -0.018 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) 
Oldest Child Aged 6 – 14 0.006* 0.006* 0.032*** 0.032*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) 
Oldest Child Aged 15 – 17 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.048*** 0.049*** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) 
Primary Earner Age 30 – 39 0.001 0.0003 -0.008 -0.009 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014) 
Primary Earner Age 40 – 40 -0.004 -0.004 -0.024 -0.024* 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014) 
Primary Earner Age 50 - 59 -0.005 -0.005 -0.022 -0.023 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.017) 
Primary Earner Age 60 + -0.008 -0.008 -0.043 -0.043 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.027) (0.027) 
High School Graduate 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.042 0.042 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.026) (0.026) 
Some College 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.032 0.031 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.026) (0.026) 
College Graduate 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.014 0.015 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.026) (0.026) 
More than College 0.022*** 0.023*** -0.003 -0.003 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.025) (0.025) 
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Table 28 (cont’d) Very Low Food Security Food Insecurity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Employed Part-Time -0.004 -0.005 0.010 0.010 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.023) (0.023) 
Unemployed 0.014 0.014 0.045 0.046 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.033) (0.033) 
Not Employed, Disabled 0.053 0.053 0.224*** 0.225*** 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.057) (0.057) 
Not Employed, Retired or Out of Labor 
Force 
0.008 0.008 0.004 0.004 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.033) (0.033) 
Military -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.049*** -0.048*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.016) (0.016) 
Household Income 100% - 130% of 
Poverty 
-0.019 -0.019 -0.059** -0.059** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.026) (0.026) 
Household Income 130% - 185% of 
Poverty 
-0.026** -0.0253** -0.114*** -0.113*** 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.024) (0.024) 
Household Income Above 185% of 
Poverty 
-0.038*** -0.037*** -0.192*** -0.192*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020) 
Missing Income -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.192*** -0.191*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.021) (0.021) 
State Unemployment Rate in 2008 0.0007 0.0007 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 0.020 0.026 0.222*** 0.237*** 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.034) (0.037) 
Observations 7,793 7,793 7,793 7,793 
R-squared 0.041 0.042 0.119 0.119 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). 
Sample includes households with more than one adult. All estimates weighted by the Food Security Supplement (FSS) weight. Robust standard 
errors provided in parentheses. Covariates include household income relative to poverty, age of the primary earner, age of the oldest child, 
race/ethnic status, nativity, household composition, educational attainment, employment, state unemployment rate, and the supply of banks in the 
CBSA.. See text for further detail. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 29. Extent of Household Financial Sharing, by Gender of Respondent 
 Overall Shared Finances Some Shared & Some Separate Separate Finances 
 Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Overall  26.78% 51.27 27.65% 48.93% 28.67% 50.48% 21.33% 57.94% 
           
Children’s Food Security Status During 2008          
High Food Security 0.880 (0.325) 
0.799 
(0.400) 
0.881 
(0.324) 
0.825 
(0.380) 
0.905 
(0.294) 
0.835 
(0.371) 
0.865 
(0.342) 
0.692 
(0.462) 
Marginal Food Security 0.061 (0.239) 
0.089 
(0.284) 
0.065 
(0.246) 
0.084 
(0.277) 
0.034 
(0.182) 
0.077 
(0.267) 
0.079 
(0.270) 
0.122 
(0.328) 
Low Food Security 0.052 (0.222) 
0.098 
(0.297) 
0.052 
(0.221) 
0.083 
(0.276) 
0.051 
(0.219) 
0.073 
(0.261) 
0.041 
(0.199) 
0.152 
(0.359) 
Very Low Food Security 0.007 (0.082) 
0.014 
(0.117) 
0.003 
(0.056) 
0.009 
(0.093) 
0.011 
(0.102) 
0.014 
(0.118) 
0.015 
(0.123) 
0.034 
(0.182) 
         
Use of Food Assistance         
SNAP, Last 12 Months 0.064 (0.245) 
0.132 
(0.338) 
0.068 
(0.251) 
0.101 
(0.301) 
0.035 
(0.184) 
0.108 
(0.311) 
0.097 
(0.297) 
0.238 
(0.426) 
Emergency Food, Last 12 Months 0.034 (0.180) 
0.056 
(0.230) 
0.033 
(0.180) 
0.048 
(0.215) 
0.024 
(0.152) 
0.050 
(0.219) 
0.066 
(0.250) 
0.097 
(0.296) 
WIC, Last 30 Days 0.057 (0.232) 
0.086 
(0.280) 
0.057 
(0.233) 
0.079 
(0.270) 
0.043 
(0.203) 
0.082 
(0.274) 
0.092 
(0.290) 
0.140 
(0.347) 
Received Free or Reduced Price NSLP, 
Last 30 Days 
0.123 
(0.328) 
0.215 
(0.411) 
0.124 
(0.330) 
0.175 
(0.380) 
0.076 
(0.265) 
0.184 
(0.388) 
0.197 
(0.399) 
0.373 
(0.484) 
Received Free or Reduced Price NSBP, 
Last 30 Days 
0.082 
(0.275) 
0.162 
(0.368) 
0.084 
(0.278) 
0.130 
(0.336) 
0.039 
(0.195) 
0.130 
(0.337) 
0.151 
(0.359) 
0.291 
(0.455) 
         
Observations 2,123 4,197 1,498 2,758 401 750 158 442 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children and more than one adult in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All sample statistics weighted by 
the Food Security Supplement (FSS) weight. Standard deviations provided in parentheses. 
100 
 
Table 30. Impact of Financial Resource Sharing on Food Security of Children, by Gender of Respondent 
 
Very Low Food Security Food Insecurity 
 
Female 
Respondent Male Respondent 
Female 
Respondent Male Respondent 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
At Least Some Sharing of 
Financial Resources 
-0.013 -0.008 -0.049** 0.026 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.023) (0.023) 
     Observations 3,947 2,057 3,947 2,057 
R-squared 0.052 0.044 0.129 0.13 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). 
Sample includes households with more than one adult. All estimates weighted by the Food Security Supplement (FSS) weight. Robust standard 
errors provided in parentheses. Covariates include household income relative to poverty, age of the primary earner, age of the oldest child, 
race/ethnic status, nativity, household composition, educational attainment, employment, state unemployment rate, and the supply of banks in the 
CBSA. See text for further detail. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 31. Child Food Security and Use of Food Assistance, by Respondent’s Participation in Financial Decisions of Household 
 Overall A Lot Some Not at All 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Overall Sample - 82.37% 15.99% 1.65% 
Child Food Security Status During 2008     
High Food Security 0.853 (0.354) 
0.862 
(0.345) 
0.808 
(0.394) 
0.834 
(0.373) 
Marginal Food Security 0.070 (0.255) 
0.069 
(0.254) 
0.072 
(0.259) 
0.065 
(0.248) 
Low Food Security 0.068 (0.252) 
0.061 
(0.240) 
0.104 
(0.306) 
0.062 
(0.242) 
Very Low Food Security 0.009 (0.095) 
0.007 
(0.085) 
0.016 
(0.124) 
0.039 
(0.194) 
     
Use of Food Assistance     
SNAP, Last 12 Months 0.087 (0.283) 
0.080 
(0.272) 
0.116 
(0.320) 
0.162 
(0.370) 
Emergency Food, Last 12 Months 0.041 (0.199) 
0.040 
(0.195) 
0.047 
(0.213) 
0.052 
(0.248) 
WIC, Last 30 Days 0.070 (0.256) 
0.065 
(0.246) 
0.093 
(0.291) 
0.135 
(0.343) 
Received Free or Reduced Price NSLP, Last 30 Days 0.151 (0.358) 
0.144 
(0.351) 
0.183 
(0.387) 
0.241 
(0.430) 
Received Free or Reduced Price NSBP, Last 30 Days 0.111 (0.315) 
0.106 
(0.307) 
0.135 
(0.342) 
0.170 
(0.378) 
     
Observations 7,064 5,855 1,081 118 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children and more than one adult in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All sample statistics weighted by 
the Food Security Supplement (FSS) weight. Standard deviations provided in parentheses. 
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Table 32. Impact of Amount of Participation n Financial Decisions on Food Security Status of Children 
 
Very Low Food Security 
Among Children 
Food Insecurity Among 
Children 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
A Lot of Participation -0.007  
-0.026** 
 (0.005) 
 
(0.011) 
 
Some or A Lot of Participation  
-0.022 
 
0.014 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.034) 
Married Couple -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.037* -0.035* 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.020) (0.020) 
Single Parent 0.009 0.009 0.024 0.023 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.017) (0.017) 
African-American, Non-Hispanic 0.011 0.010 0.031* 0.031* 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.017) (0.017) 
Hispanic 0.002 0.0022 0.014 0.015 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014) 
Native-born Citizen -0.010 -0.010* -0.010 -0.012 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) 
Oldest Child Aged 6 - 14 0.004 0.004 0.030*** 0.030*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) 
Oldest Child Aged 15 - 17 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) 
Primary Earner Age 30 – 39 -0.002 -0.002 -0.015 -0.015 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014) 
Primary Earner Age 40 - 49 -0.005 -0.005 -0.026* -0.026* 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.015) 
Primary Earner Age 50 - 59 -0.001 -0.001 -0.017 -0.017 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.018) 
Primary Earner Age 60+ -0.011 -0.011* -0.041 -0.041 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.030) (0.030) 
High School Graduate 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.013 0.013 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.028) (0.028) 
Some College 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.005 0.004 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.028) (0.028) 
College Graduate 0.019** 0.019** -0.009 -0.010 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.029) (0.028) 
More than College 0.019*** 0.019** -0.025 -0.027 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.028) (0.028) 
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Table 32 (cont’d) Very Low Food Security Food Insecurity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Employed Part-Time -0.003 -0.003 0.018 0.017 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.024) (0.024) 
Unemployed 0.009 0.009 0.027 0.027 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.034) (0.034) 
Not Employed, Disabled 0.048 0.049 0.216*** 0.215*** 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.062) (0.061) 
Not Employed, Retired or Out of Labor 
Force 
-0.006 -0.006 0.0002 -0.002 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.036) (0.037) 
Military -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.045*** -0.045*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.016) (0.016) 
Household Income 100% - 135% of 
Poverty 
-0.013 -0.013 -0.053* -0.052* 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.029) (0.029) 
Household Income 130% - 185% of 
Poverty 
-0.012 -0.013 -0.102*** -0.102*** 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.027) (0.027) 
Household Income Above 185% of 
Poverty 
-0.028*** -0.028*** -0.188*** -0.189*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.022) (0.022) 
Missing Household Income -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.189*** -0.189*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.023) (0.023) 
State Unemployment Rate in 2008 0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 0.015 0.031 0.259*** 0.227*** 
(0.012) (0.026) (0.037) (0.048) 
Observations 7,054 7,054 7,054 7,054 
R-squared 0.034 0.034 0.117 0.115 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). 
Sample includes households with more than one adult. All estimates weighted by the Food Security Supplement (FSS) weight. Robust standard 
errors provided in parentheses. Covariates include household income relative to poverty, age of the primary earner, age of the oldest child, 
race/ethnic status, nativity, household composition, educational attainment, employment, state unemployment rate, and the supply of banks in the 
CBSA. See text for further detail. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 33. Child Food Security Status and Use of Food Assistance, by Participation in Financial Decisions of Household and Gender of Respondent 
 Overall A Lot Some Not at All 
 Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Overall Sample 27.83% 49.2% 28.03% 50.03% 27.80% 45.42% 18.41% 46.82% 
Children’s Food Security Status during 2008        
High Food Security 0.886 (0.318) 
0.827 
(0.378) 
0.897 
(0.303) 
0.833 
(0.373) 
0.828 
(0.378) 
0.791 
(0.407) 
0.850 
(0.365) 
0.844 
(0.367) 
Marginal Food Security 0.058 (0.234) 
0.082 
(0.275) 
0.056 
(0.229) 
0.085 
(0.279) 
0.074 
(0.262) 
0.064 
(0.245) 
- 0.090 
(0.290) 
Low Food Security 0.051 (0.221) 
0.081 
(0.273) 
0.041 
(0.199) 
0.073 
(0.261) 
0.098 
(0.298) 
0.126 
(0.333) 
0.150 
(0.365) 
0.043 
(0.204) 
Very Low Food Security 0.005 (0.068) 
0.001 
(0.099) 
0.006 
(0.075) 
0.008 
(0.089) 
- 0.019 
(0.137) 
- 0.023 
(0.152) 
         
Use of Food Assistance         
SNAP, Last 12 Months 0.061 (0.239) 
0.102 
(0.303) 
0.053 
(0.223) 
0.099 
(0.299) 
0.104 
(0.305) 
0.114 
(0.318) 
0.051 
(0.229) 
0.135 
(0.345) 
Emergency Food, Last 12 Months 0.031 (0.174) 
0.049 
(0.215) 
0.030 
(0.170) 
0.047 
(0.212) 
0.041 
(0.198) 
0.052 
(0.222) 
- 0.102 
(0.306) 
WIC, Last 30 Days 0.054 (0.227) 
0.079 
(0.270) 
0.050 
(0.218) 
0.076 
(0.265) 
0.073 
(0.260) 
0.097 
(0.297) 
0.117 
(0.296) 
0.099 
(0.302) 
Free/Reduced Price NSLP, Last 30 
Days 
0.114 
(0.318) 
0.176 
(0.381) 
0.110 
(0.313) 
0.171 
(0.377) 
0.136 
(0.343) 
0.204 
(0.403) 
0.060 
(0.243) 
0.201 
(0.405) 
Free/Reduced Price NSBP, Last 30 
Days  
0.075 
(0.263) 
0.130 
(0.336) 
0.072 
(0.259) 
0.126 
(0.332) 
0.088 
(0.283) 
0.152 
(0.359) 
0.060 
(0.243) 
0.138 
(0.348) 
         
Observations 1,902 3,509 1,584 2,971 296 489 22 49 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children and more than one adult in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). All sample statistics weighted by 
the Food Security Supplement (FSS) weight. Standard deviations provided in parentheses.  
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Table 34. Impact of Amount of Participation in Financial Decisions and Food Security Status of Children, by 
Gender 
 
Very Low Food Security Food Insecurity 
 
Female Male Female Male 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
A Lot of Financial Participation -0.010 0.009** -0.040** -0.034* 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.017) (0.020) 
     Observations 3,515 1,900 3,515 1,900 
R-squared 0.046 0.042 0.122 0.145 
Notes: Author’s calculations using households with children in both the December 2008 and January 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS). 
Sample includes households with more than one adult. All estimates weighted by the Food Security Supplement (FSS) weight. Robust standard 
errors provided in parentheses. Covariates include household income relative to poverty, age of the primary earner, age of the oldest child, 
race/ethnic status, nativity, household composition, educational attainment, employment, state unemployment rate, and the supply of banks in the 
CBSA. See text for further detail. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
